- If you didn't get an email confirmation that I received your referee report, let me know
- The empirical project is due April 14th at 5pm
- Pay attention to what each part is asking for (tables, figures, amount of explanation, etc.)
- Each part should be presented on its own and numbered (rather than trying to integrate the parts together)
- Graphs and tables should be produced by you from raw data, not reproduced from another source
- Remember to turn it in as a well-formatted pdf

The Clark hypothesis: Rich people are better and drive out the poor

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Rich breed more	\rightarrow	Rich people's values spread	\rightarrow	More patience, work, ingenuity	\rightarrow	Enrichment of all

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McCloskey's Critique of Clark

The Classes and the Virtues

Aristocrat Patrician Peasant Plebeian Bourgeois Mercantile

pagan Achilles pride of being honor forthrightness lovalty courage wit courtesy propriety magnanimity justice foresight moderation love grace subjective

Christian St. Francis pride of service duty candor solidarity fortitude jocularity reverence humility benevolence fairness wisdom frugality charity dignity objective

secular Benjamin Franklin pride of action integrity honesty trustworthiness enterprise humor respect modesty consideration responsibility prudence thrift affection self-possession conjective


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From McCloskey, "Bourgeois Virtue", 1994

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- So how is McCloskey establishing the 'virtues praised by people'
- A typical economist approach would be to say let's see which virtues get priced more highly in markets
- But is this a sensible approach given McCloskey's bigger question?
- Is it even possible to find markets that price virtues?

FIGURE 1: RECIPIENT PREFERENCES



	Men	Women
Users	3,004	2,783
First-contact behavior		
Profiles browsed	385,470	172,946
First-contact e-mails	49,223	14,178
(Percentage of browses)	12.7	8.2
Matching		
First contacts that lead to match	2,130	914
(Percentage of first contacts)	4.3	6.4
E-mails exchanged until match is achieved		
Mean	11.6	12.6
Median	6	6
SD	22.8	26.3

TABLE 4-USER BEHAVIOR SUMMARY STATISTICS

From Hitsch, Hortacsu and Ariely, "Matching and Sorting in Online Dating" AER 2010

	Preference of men					Preference of women			
	(1)		(2)	(3)		(4)		
	Estimate	SE	Estimatea	SE ^a	Estimate	SE	Estimatea	SE ^a	
Age	-0.0598	0.0023	-0.0605	0.0041	-0.0098	0.0034	-0.0095	0.0077	
Age difference (+)	-0.0007	0.0002	-0.0007	0.0004	-0.0016	0.0002	-0.0016	0.0006	
Age difference (-)	-0.005	0.0001	-0.0051	0.0003	-0.0063	0.0004	-0.0064	0.0011	
Single; mate divorcedb	-0.0461	0.0231	-0.0446	0.0273	-0.0718	0.0316	-0.0688	0.033	
Both divorced	0.0959	0.0275	0.0961	0.0285	0.1728	0.0305	0.1789	0.0392	
Both "long term"	0.0177	0.0178	0.0191	0.0199	0.2388	0.0258	0.2398	0.0322	
Both have children	0.1874	0.0271	0.187	0.0532	0.2039	0.0298	0.1973	0.0366	
Neither has children	-0.2649	0.0224	-0.264	0.0333	-0.3636	0.0334	-0.3681	0.0423	
Has photo	-0.0657	0.0341	-0.0623	0.0522	0.1318	0.0457	0.1365	0.0576	
Looks rating	0.5604	0.0144	0.5631	0.0201	0.5848	0.0211	0.5842	0.0269	
"Very good" looks	0.5719	0.0396	0.5763	0.0545	0.5516	0.0555	0.5578	0.0688	
"Above average" looks	0.2738	0.0363	0.2773	0.0412	0.1733	0.0495	0.1761	0.0627	
"Other" looks	0.1742	0.2044	0.1682	0.2096	0.0842	0.2073	0.0519	0.2263	
Height	-0.1421	0.0066	-0.1423	0.0101	0.1831	0.0093	0.1826	0.0149	
Height difference (+)	-0.0018	0.0037	-0.0044	0.0095	-0.0096	0.0006	-0.0098	0.0011	
Height difference (-)	-0.0099	0.0005	-0.0099	0.0008	-0.0227	0.0093	-0.0296	0.0186	
BMI	-0.3962	0.028	-0.3932	0.0474	0.1332	0.0499	0.1354	0.0618	
BMI ²	0.0043	0.0006	0.0042	0.0009	-0.0007	0.001	-0.0006	0.0013	
BMI difference (+)	0.0034	0.0008	0.0034	0.0011	-0.0103	0.0008	-0.0108	0.0013	
BMI difference (-)	-0.0101	0.0005	-0.01	0.0012	0.0022	0.0009	0.0025	0.0011	
Education (years)	-0.0031	0.0056	-0.0037	0.0067	0.047	0.0076	0.0472	0.0095	
Education	-0.0039	0.001	-0.0039	0.0011	-0.0086	0.0012	-0.0087	0.0016	
difference (+)									
Education difference (-)	-0.0026	0.0008	-0.0027	0.001	-0.0022	0.0013	-0.0021	0.0016	
Income (\$ 1,000)	0.0053	0.0012	0.0054	0.0013	0.0164	0.0029	0.0163	0.0031	
Income (>50) ^c	-0.0027	0.0019	-0.0028	0.0019	-0.0062	0.0035	-0.006	0.0035	
Income (>100) ^c	-0.0047	0.0021	-0.0046	0.0021	-0.0082	0.0016	-0.0082	0.0016	
Income (>200) ^c	-0.0018	0.0034	-0.0018	0.0037	0.0074	0.0018	0.0075	0.0019	
Income difference (+)	6.31E-06	4.07E-06	6.01E-06	4.21E-06	-1.20E-05	3.15E-06	-1.28E-05	3.90E-06	
Income difference (-)	1.17E-08	2.53E-06	-5.11E-08	3.39E-06	1.04E-05	6.00E-06	1.21E-05	6.73E-06	
Income "Only accountant knows"	0.3332	0.0453	0.3349	0.0516	1.0913	0.1285	1.085	0.1418	
Income "What, me work?"	0.2838	0.0542	0.2825	0.0541	0.7155	0.1439	0.7064	0.1564	

TABLE 3-BINARY LOGIT ESTIMATES

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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Estimate	SE	Estimatea	SE ^a	Estimate	SE	Estimate ^a	SE ^a
White: mate black	-0.8301	0.0861	-0.831	0.1051	-0.743	0.1195	-0.7426	0.1529
White: mate Hispanic	-0.2821	0.0367	-0.2873	0.04	-0.5752	0.0897	-0.5749	0.0924
White; mate Asian	-0.4952	0.0436	-0.4983	0.0604	-1.5952	0.2408	-1.6153	0.2854
White; mate other	-0.135	0.0375	-0.1397	0.0408	0.5677	0.0742	-0.5624	0.0806
Black; mate white	-0.235	0.3701	-0.2214	0.5134	-1.5937	0.3806	-1.1607	0.4257
Black; mate Hispanic	-0.2358	0.4211	-0.2251	0.4657	-1.6185	0.8779	-2.7724	2.5201
Black; mate Asian	-0.6856	0.4609	-0.6981	0.5075				
Black; mate other	0.1764	0.4215	0.1793	0.5399	-0.8192	0.5738	-0.9328	0.8192
Hispanic; mate white	-0.3843	0.1436	-0.351	0.19	-0.6522	0.2303	-0.4896	0.2645
Hispanic: mate black	-0.3787	0.3549	-0.6907	0.6551	0.8487	0.5082	-0.6407	0.5446
Hispanic; mate Asian	-0.3161	0.2548	-0.2811	0.2799				
Hispanic; mate other	-0.1886	0.2058	-0.1591	0.2493	-0.6777	0.3829	-0.5726	0.3771
Asian; mate white	-0.4617	0.3055	-0.3412	0.3569	-0.0291	0.4627	0.284	0.4246
Asian; mate black					-0.7563	0.9058	-0.4601	0.738
Asian: mate Hispanic	-0.0645	0.421	-0.0475	0.3277	-0.4781	0.5994	-0.228	0.4573
Asian; mate other	0.0383	0.4442	0.1108	0.5107	-0.374	0.5701	-0.1002	0.5644
Same religion	0.1792	0.0218	0.1799	0.0236	0.2918	0.0264	0.2846	0.0306
I/Pr(get reply)			0.0008	0.0007			0.0333	0.0763
Log-likelihood	-72,073.70		-72,093.10 (2,401.7)		-48,998.90		-49,041.40 (1,434.4)	
Observations	242,478				196,363			
Individuals	3,004				2,783			

TABLE 3—BINARY LOGIT ESTIMATES (Continued)

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


FIGURE 1. EVIDENCE FOR/AGAINST STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR

J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017

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Thus, even if unattractive men (or women) take the cost of rejection and composing an e-mail into account, this perceived most is not large enough such that the net expected benefit of hearing back from a very attractive mate would be less than the net expected benefit of hearing back from a less attractive mate. These results suggest that...strategic behavior is of little importance in online dating.

- Online dating and sperm donation aren't going to get us at historical shifts in the prices of virtues
- We'll take two very different looks at pricing virtue
- First, we'll consider a survey by Siwan Anderson, "The Economic of Dowry and Brideprice" (Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2007)
- Then we'll return to McCloskey's various writings, including "The Discreet Virtues of the Bourgeoisie" (History Today, 2006)

- Anderson is going to look at the prevalence and determinants of brideprices and dowries
- **Brideprice** transfer from the family of the groom to the family of the bride, present in two thirds of preindustrial societies (Murdock, 1967)
- **Dowry** transfer from the family of the bride to the family of the groom, less prevalent in terms of number of societies, more prevalent in terms of population
- These transfers can be large and vary substantially

Table 1	
Prevalence of Brideprice in Contemporary Societies	

Country	Years	Paid a brideprice	# Observations
Rural China	1950-2000	79%	451
Urban China	1933-1987	9%	586
Taiwan	1940-1975	53%	964
Rural Thailand	1950-1978	93%	248
Urban Thailand	1950-1978	79%	395
Cairo (Egypt)	1940-1976	93%	919
Damascus (Syria)	1940-1976	84%	1164
Kinshasa (Zaire)	1940-1976	96%	694
Tororo (Uganda)	1940-1976	95%	781
Urban Iran	1971-1991	99%	511
Uganda	1960-1996	73%	1657
Rural Uganda	1960-1980	98%	155
Rural Uganda	1980-1990	88%	364
Rural Uganda	1990-1996	65%	226
Urban Uganda	1960-1980	96%	93
Urban Uganda	1980-1990	79%	379
Urban Uganda	1990-1996	46%	440
Turkey	1944-1993	29%	6519
Rural Turkey	1960-1975	46%	127
Rural Turkey	1975-1985	37%	205
Rural Turkey	1985-1998	23%	286
Urban Turkey	1960-1975	34%	210
Urban Turkey	1975-1985	24%	367
Urban Turkey	1985-1998	12%	650

Source: Information for rural China comes from Brown (2003); for urban China, from Whyte (1993); for Taiwan, from Parish and Willis (1993); for Thailand refer to Cherlin and Chamratrithirong (1988). Statistics for cities of Egypt, Syria, Zaire, and Uganda are from Huzayyin and Acsádi (1976), and for Iran, see Habibi (1997). The data used for the statistics from Uganda and Turkey are from the Demographic Health Surveys.

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Table 2

Prevalence of Dowry in Contemporary Societies

Country	Years	Paid a dowry	# Observations	
Rural India	1960-1995	93%	1217	
Rural India	1970-1994	94%	1842	
Rural Pakistan	1970-1993	97%	1030	
Pakistan	1986-1991	87%	1300	
Rural Bangladesh	1945-1960	3%	2303	
Rural Bangladesh	1960-1975	11%	3367	
Rural Bangladesh	1975-1990	44%	3745	
Rural Bangladesh	1990-1996	61%	1065	
Rural Bangladesh	2003	76%	1279	

Source: Information for the first sample from rural India comes from the NCAER (National Council of Applied Economic Research, India) data provided by Vijayendra Rao. The second sample is from the Survey on the Status of Women and Fertility (SWAF) by the Population Studies Center, University of Pennsylvania. For Pakistan, the first sample is from the SWAF, the second from the surveys of the World Bank's Living Standards Measurement Study. The Bangladesh data for the earlier years is from the Matlab RAND Family Life Surveys; the final sample, for the year 2003, is from Suran, Amin, Huq, and Chowdury (2004).

Image: Image:

Table 3

Marriage Transfers from the Groom's Side

Society	Time period	Average payments	Magnitude of average payments
Germanic Tribes:			
Visogoths (Spain)	9 th century		1/10 husband's wealth (Quale, 1988)
Lombards (Italy)	9 th century		1/4 husband's wealth (Quale, 1988)
Franks (France)	9 th century		1/3 husband's wealth (Quale, 1988)
Asia:			
Rural interior provinces (China)	1960-2000	538 yuan (1985)	82% of value of household durables (Brown, 2003)
Rural south west (China)	1983–1987	700 yuan (1987)	 1.1 × per capita annual income (Harrell, 1992)
Rural east Szechwan	1966-1981	109 yuan (1980)	1 × per capita annual income (Lavely, 1988)
Middle East:			
Palestine	1920s	£49 (1925)	8 years of income for landless agricultural laborer (Papps, 1983)
Urban Iran	1971–1991	1,807,200 Iranian rials (1980)	\$7059 (Habibi, 1997)
Sub-Saharan Africa:			
Rural Zimbabwe	1940-1995	8–9 cattle	2-4 × gross household annual income (Dekker and Hoogeveen, 2002)
Bantu tribe (southern Africa)	1955	100 goats	Larger than average herd size per household (Gray, 1960)
East African herders	1940-1978	15–50 large stock	12–20 × per capita holdings of large stock (Turton, 1980)
Uganda	1960-2001	872,601 shillings (2000)	14% of household income (Bishai and Grossbard, 2006)

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Table 4

Marriage Transfers from the Bride's Side

Society	Time period	Average payments	Magnitude of average payments
Historical			
Europe:			
Athens	6 th Century BC		10% bride's father's wealth (Quale 1988)
Mediterranean Jews	969-1250	150–1500 dinars	800 dinars could maintain a family for 30 years (Goiten, 1978)
Tuscany	1415-1436	125.5 florins	20% bride's household wealth (Botticini, 1999)
Urban Tuscany	1420-1436	1507.7 lire	6× annual wage of skilled worker (Botticini and Siow, 2003)
Florence	1475-1499	1430 florins	3× average fiscal wealth per household (Molho, 1994)
Colonial Latin America:			
Mexico	1640-1790	1000–5000 pesos	Equal to the cost of 3–16 slaves (Lavrin and Couturier, 1979)


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South Asia:			
Rural Karnataka (India)	1960–1995	66,322 Rupees (1995)	6× annual village male wage (Rahman and Rao, 2004)
Rural Uttar Pradesh (India)	1960-1995	46,096 Rupees (1995)	3× annual village male wage (Rahman and Rao, 2004)
Rural south- central India	1920s-1980s	4,792 Rupees (1983)	68% of total household assets before marriage (Rao, 1993)
Rural Uttar Pradesh (India)	1970–1994	\$700	7× per capita annual income (Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 2001)
Rural Tamil Nadu (India)	1970–1994	\$769	8× per capita annual income (Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 2001)
Delhi (India)	1920-1984	>50,000 Rupees (1984)	$4 \times$ annual male income (Paul, 1986)
Rural Bangladesh	1996	12,700 Taka (1996)	62% of average annual household gross income (Esteve-Volart, 2004)
Rural Pakistan	1986–1991	18,196 Rupees (1991)	$1.13 \times \text{annual household income}$ (Anderson, 2005)
Urban Pakistan	1986–1991	32,451 Rupees (1991)	$1.23 \times \text{annual household income}$ (Anderson, 2005)

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According to Chojnacki (2000), the Renaissance marriage market valued maturity in grooms, chaste youth in brides, and family wealth and prominence for both. – Anderson, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2007 Typically, in India, the most important quality...for a groom is the ability to earn a living, often reflected in his educational level (Caldwell, Reddy, and Caldwell, 1983; Billig, 1992). – Anderson, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2007


McCloskey's Evidence



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'How to Be Good', we're going to call it. It's about how we should all live our lives. You know, suggestions. Like taking in the homeless, and giving away your money, and what to do about things like property ownership and, I don't know, the Third World and so on. – Nick Horby, How to Be Good (2001) ...in the nineteenth century, 'bourgeois' became the most pejorative term of all, particularly in the mouths of socialists and artists, and later even of fascists. – Johan Huizinga, The Spirit of the Netherlands, 1935

McCloskey's Evidence




J. Parman (College of William & Mary) Global Economic

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In 1811 Jane Austen's best characters show both sense and sensibility. They calculate their marriage prospects but take a serious, almost Puritan attitude toward their ethical maturation. Austen's little stage is the gentry. But her ethical world is bourgeois. – McCloskey, The Discrete Virtues of the Bourgeoisie, 2006 Contrast the world of Shakespeare. The warm virtues, Love and Courage, Faith and Hope, the virtues praised most often by Shakespeare, and least by Adam Smith, are specifically and essentially non-calculative. – McCloskey, The Discrete Virtues of the Bourgeoisie


McCloskey's Evidence



April 3, 2017 26 / 30

If we are marked to die, we are enow To do our country loss; and if to live, The fewer men, the greater share of honour. And gentlemen in England now a-bed Shall think themselves accursed they were not here, And hold their manhoods cheap whiles any speaks That fought with us upon St Crispin's Day. – Shakespeare, Henry V, 1599 This is not bourgeois, Prudential rhetoric. It counts not the cost. – McCloskey, The Discrete Virtues of the Bourgeoisie

What We Learn from Literature



J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017

Some More General Points to Consider on Clark

- Data on reproduction rates by income is sparse for everywhere but England
- Are the virtues (patience, hard work, literacy and so on) genetic, a product of parenting, a product of peer groups, lasting traits, etc.?
- Is there a quantifiable way to link these virtues to growth in productivity?
- Why did the virtues initially arise among the wealthy?
- What other mechanisms are there for developing these virtues?