Announcements



https://www.elections.virginia.gov/voter-outreach/voting-info-tool.html

Announcements

- No class or office hours on Tuesday, November 6th since I will be at the polls
- Don't forget about the second referee report, due Nov.
 2nd (on "A Nation of Immigrants: Assimilation and Economic Outcomes in the Age of Mass Migration" by Abramitzky, Boustan and Eriksson)
- After that, consider starting on your empirical project due November 30th
- Readings for the upcoming lectures:
 - Galenson (1981) on indentured servitude
 - Logan (2018) on Reconstruction

Labor in the Colonial Economy

- Recall that colonial economy was dominated by agriculture
- The good news: there was plenty of land to farm
- The bad news: to farm all that new land, the colonies needed more people
- More good news: wages were good in the colonies relative to Britain so people wanted to work in the colonies
- More bad news: travel from England to the colonies was extremely costly (almost equal to a German migrant's annual salary)
- Solution: indentured servitude

The Geographic Distribution of Indentured Servants


Incidence of Immigrant Servitude across Colonies, Engligh Emigration, 1773-1776

	Percentage list	
	Total emigration	as servants
Northern colonies		_
Canada	31	9.68
Nova Scotia	425	7.76
New England	54	1.85
New York	303	11.55
Middle colonies		
Pennsylvania	859	78.81
Maryland	2217	98.33
Virginia	767	90.35
Southern colonies		
Carolinas	106	23.58
Georgia	196	17.86
Florida	5	0

Credit Constraints and Indentured Servitude

- The cost of passage to America was £5 to £10, an amount greater than average annual income at the time
- To put that in perspective, think about college tuition
- If there were no student loans, how would people pay for college?
- Maybe you work first and save up for college
- Median income for a high school graduate age 25 to 34 in 2016 was \$32,143 (CPS data)

Credit Constraints and Indentured Servitude



Sources: College Board, Annual Survey of Colleges; NCES, IPEDS Fall 2015 Enrollment data.

Credit Constraints and Indentured Servitude

- Let's continue thinking about the college example
- Suppose we did write indenture contracts for college that covered tuition in return for working for a company for a specified number of years
- What might determine the length of this contract?
 - Choice of major
 - Grades in college
 - Skills like computer programming
 - Job characteristics
- In theory, you could learn quite a bit about a worker given the contract they signed

How Indentured Servitude Works - Standard

Laborer and shipper strike a contract trading a period of labor for passage



Shipper transports laborer to America



Shipper sells the contract to employer in America



After contract is up, servant becomes a free laborer

How Indentured Servitude Works - Redemptioners

Laborer borrows money from the shipper to pay for passage and supplies



Shipper transports laborer to the colonies




Laborer finds an employer and negotiates a contract long enough to pay back shipper



After contract is up, servant becomes a free laborer

How Indentured Servitude Works



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How Indentured Servitude Works

This indentured...between [Alexander Beard]...of the one part, and [John Dickey]...of the other part, witnesseth, that the said [Alexander Beard] doth hereby covenant, promise and grant, to ...[John Dickey]...and his assigns, from the day of the date hereof until the first and next arrival at [Philadelphia] in America...and during the term of [three] years to serve in such service and employment as the said [John Dickey] or [his] assigns shall there employ [him]...In consideration whereof the said [John Dickey] doth grant...to pay for [his] passage, and to find allow [him] meat, drink, apparel and lodging, with other necessaries, during the said term; and at the end of the said term to pay unto him the usual allowance, according to the custom of the country in the like kind...

Features of a Contract

- The main thing negotiated on the contract was the length
- Fairly standard was the provision of food, shelter and clothing during the length of the contract
- Contracts also included freedom dues (payments at the end of the contract)
- Some included the equivalent of a no-trade clause
- What kind of issues might come up? Servants trying to leave before contract is up, employers trying to shirk on provision of goods.


- Why would people get different contract lengths?
- Everyone's passage cost pretty much the same amount so the initial debt is the same for everyone.
- Differences in contract length would then mean that people differed in how valuable their labor was.
- More productive workers would get shorter contracts.


ESTIMATED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, MIDDLESEX AND LONDON SAMPLES


Independent Variable	MIDDLESEX	MIDDLESEX, 1683-84		London, 1718-59	
	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	
Age (years):a					
Total sample:					
Less than 15	2.655	.385	2.749	.134	
15	2.201	.400	2.147	.080	
16	1.457	.304	1.304	.068	
17	.893	.367	.728	.062	
18	.174	.270	.331	.055	
19	.738	.306	.169	.050	
Sex ^b	-1.484	.207	195	.073	
Literacyc	575	.217	082	.037	
Date ^d			0060	.0023	
Tradee	727	.445			
Farmer ^t			313	.074	
Laborer			146	.079	
Services ⁸			348	.066	
Metal and construction ^h			320	.067	
Clothing and textiles			313	.060	
Antiguai	227	.812	403	.110	
Barbados	553	.274	176	.154	
Jamaica	398	.462	233	.060	
Other West Indiesk	401	1.094	479	.088	
Maryland	.203	.209	.306	.059	
Virginia			.127	.073	
Other mainland ¹	389	.673	.050	.116	
Constant	5.227		4.665		
R^2	.555		.539		
F	12.87		112.82		
n	171		2.049		


Contract Length and Servant Characteristics

	Months More or
Characteristic	Less Service
15 years old	26
17 years old	9
19 years old	2
Female	-2
Literate	-1
Farmer	-4
Metalworker	-4
Textile worker	-4













Growth of the Colonial Population - Free laborers, indentured servants and slaves





- Two big changes altered the incentives to enter into indentured servitude: British wages rose and the cost of transatlantic passage dropped
- Higher British wages both reduced the incentive to migrate and made it easier to save up money for passage
- Lower cost of passage made it easier for laborers to finance the trip themselves
- Lower cost of passage also made it cheaper for employers in the colonies to acquire slaves














Slavery and the American Economy



A Brief History of Slavery

- Slaves came to the New World beginning in the early 1500s on French and Spanish expeditions
- Slaves first arrived in British North America in Virginia in 1619 (just a few miles from here)
- The trans-Atlantic slave trade continued until 1808 when it was banned by both the United States and England
- The internal slave trade continued until the Civil War
- Individual states abolish slavery at different times during the 18th and 19th centuries
- Slavery is officially abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865

About the latter end of August, a Dutch man of Warr of the burden of a 160 tunnes arrived at Point-Comfort . . . He brought not any thing but 20. and odd Negroes, wch the Governor and Cape Marchant bought for victualls (whereof he was in greate need as he prtended) at the best and easyest rates they could. . . .—John Rolf to Sir Edwin Sandys, 1619




... D. at they have a Parmity it will be agreeable.

WILLIAMSBURG, November 27, 1777.


TO BE SOLD, by Order of the President and Masters for ready Money, at Nostoning Quarter, on Monday the 22d of December, about thirty likely Negroes, a so most of the Stock thereon, with the Plantation Utensits The Land will be leased out for three Lives, or twenty one Years, to the highest Bidder. There are also several Plantations in Surry may be leased for the same Number of Years.

Ti is defined that those Gentlemen, who are indebted to the College by Bond or open Accounts, will immediately make Payment, or else they will be given to an Atterney without further Notice, by


JOHN CARTER, Burfar,




The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade



Slavery Within the United States



Slave Populations in the South, 1790-1860



Slavery Within the United States



Some Legal Aspects of Slavery

- Slaves were considered property and the laws governing them were developed from laws regarding personal property, animals, servants and employees
- Laws existed to protect slaves from excessive abuse but still allowed greater punishment than for other employees
- Initially manumission was legal as it was seen as an inherent right of property ownership but by the 1830s, many southern states limited manumission
- Laws regarding slave sales differed from many other types of contracts
- In particular, slave sellers were often required to disclose known defects and were liable for unknown defects
- Laws were often harsh for injuring someone else's slave

Slavery and the Intersection of Law and Economics

The laws governing slavery were driven in part by economics, some would also provide the foundations for several aspects of consumer protection and contract law that we consider standard today. A few examples:

- Manumission over time states limited manumission, recognizing that owners had an incentive to free slaves once they were no longer productive
- Laws requiring sellers to disclose defects some of the first laws recognizing problems of asymmetric information in markets
- Punishment slaves could be punished more severely than free laborers, part of the justification for this was a difference in available incentive schemes
- Safety laws made employers of hired slaves and common carriers liable for physical injury to slaves


Announcements

- One other cancelled class: Thursday, November 15th (I'll be at a conference in CA)
- Let me know if you did not get a confirmation email from me for your second referee report
- Start working on your empirical project due November 30th
- Readings for the upcoming lectures:
 - Logan (2018) on Reconstruction
 - Abramitzky, Boustan and Eriksson (2014) on immigration (your referee report)
 - Collins and Wanamaker (2014) on the Great Migration


Studying Slavery

- Because slaves were bought and sold and worked on plantations that kept detailed records, quite a bit of data is available to economic historians
- Data is available both for the market for slaves and for the work slaves did on plantations
- Among the data sources economic historians have used to study slavery:
 - Census slave schedules
 - Slave ship manifests
 - Records of slave sales
 - Probate records
 - Plantation ledgers
 - Slave narratives

Census Slave Schedules



Ship Manifests




Probate and Auction Records

```
Mayler, a Boy, line or cleven Jag of age,
Oliuber, man aged 33/pr of age,
clom a log. 17 yes of age, hall well grown,
                                                                1600,00
bineent, a man, 24 yes of age
                                                               1700.00
                                                                 1400.00
Suran, Morran, 23 yes of age
                                                                 1100,00
· Corriegi.
The above is a time & correct Malment of the appearing believe of the Estate of Mrs Last to Decree a correcting to our personnent, this 20 Lang 1860 A. & Rouseaux
```

Probate and Auction Records

```
4 Iron Pott Racks 30/. 1 weeding hoe 3/9.
                                                            1.13. 9
1 spade 1/. 1 Hilling hoe 6d 1 Hair Sifter 1/.
                                                             . 2. 6
1 Old Copper Coffee Pott
3 Old Pewter Dishes & 4 Plates 4/.
                                                             . 4. 0
3 Pewter Spoons 3d 1 Iron Bread Toster 2d
                                                            1. 0. 0
1 Negro Woman Named Nel Aged 64 Years
1 Negro Woman Named Amery do 54 Do
                                                            10. 0. 0
1 Old Black Horse aged 22 Years
                                                              15 0
1 Mans Saddle & Bridle
                                                             .15. 0
                                                             2. 5. 0
1 Cow
1 Small Leather Trunk 2/. 1 Japaned Tea Board 2/6.
                                                             . 4. 6
2 Bark Bottles 6d 1 Snuff Bottle 14d
                                                              . 0. 7½
```

Plantation Records



The Federal Writers' Project Slave Narratives


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that would 'commodate a whole fence rail, it wus so big, an' had pot hooks, pots, big old iron ones, an' everything er round to cook on. Aunt Winnie had a great big wooden tray dat she would fix all us little niggers' meals in an' call us up an' han' us a wooden spoon spiece an' make us all set down 'round the tray an' eat all us wanted three times er'ry day. In one corner of the kitchen set a loom my mother use to weave on. She would weave way into the night lots of times.


The fust thing I 'members is follerin' my Mother er 'round. She wuz the housegirl an' sematress an' er'rywhere she went I wuz at her heels. My father wuz the overseer on the Hunt place. In the calves an' shinin' my Master's shoes. How I did love to put a Sunday shine on his boots an' shoes! He called me his nigger an' wuz goin' ter make a barber out o' me if slavery had er helt on. As it wus, I shaved him long as he lived. He lived in the Quarters over on a high hill 'cross the spring-branch from the white peoples' house. He had confortable log cabins an' lived over there an' wuz happy. Ole Uncle Alex Hunt wuz the bugler an' ev'ry mornin' at 4:00 o'clock he blowed the bugle fer us ter git up, 'cept Sunday mornin's, us all slept later on Sundays.

Slaveholders by State and Number of Slaves




From Historical Statistics of the United States based on federal census slave schedules

Slaves by Skill




For data files, see Fogel and Engerman, "Slave Sales and Appraisals, 1775-1865" ICPSR 7421

Slave Value by Skill



For data files, see Fogel and Engerman, "Slave Sales and Appraisals, 1775-1865" ICPSR 7421

Slave Value by Gender and Age



For data files, see Fogel and Engerman, "Slave Sales and Appraisals, 1775-1865" ICPSR 7421

- Slavery is typically thought of as a Southern phenomenon and the patterns of slaveholding seem to confirm this
- This doesn't mean that slavery wouldn't work in the Northern economy
- The Northern farms faced the same labor constraints as Southern farms and in fact slaves were occasionally used in wheat production
- The growth of Southern slavery had a lot to do with the productivity of slaves in growing the southern staple crops of cotton and tobacco (and sugar in Louisiana)
- It was this high productivity in cotton and tobacco that allowed southern farmers to compete for slave labor with Caribbean sugar plantations





Figure 2. The course of U.S. cotton production, 1791-1861.



Source: Gavin Wright, The Political Economy of the Cotton South (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978): 16, adapted from USDA, Atlas of Agriculture, Part V, Advance Sheets (December 15, 1915).



The Productivity and Profitability of Slaves

- The patterns of slaveholding suggest that slaves were most productive in the South on cotton and tobacco plantations
- However, this doesn't tell us whether slavery was more profitable than accomplishing the same tasks with free labor
- One of the big debates in economic history was whether or not slavery was profitable and efficient as an institution
- An answer to this question would help to determine whether slavery was an economically viable institution (whether it would have continued if the Civil War didn't happen) and how important slavery was to American economic development

The Traditional Economic View of Slavery

"[I]t was widely believed that the slave plantations were unprofitable and inefficient enterprises that were kept in operation by a class prepared to sacrifice its private economic interest, enduring economic stagnation for the South, in order to maintain its political and cultural hegemony."

-Fogel and Engerman, 1980

The Traditional Economic View of Slavery

Up until the 1970s, the traditional view of the economics of slavery could be summarized as follows:


- Slavery was an unprofitable investment
- Slavery was a dying institution
- Slave labor was economically inefficient
- Slavery retarded the growth of the southern economy
- Slavery provided extremely poor living conditions for the typical slave (in terms of consumption, health and physical abuse)

Coerced Labor and Efficiency

Why did people think slave labor was inefficient?

- The general belief was that coerced labor would put in less effort than paid labor and would be more likely to engage in forms of resistance
- People thought that even with the threat of punishment to get slaves to work, the productivity of a slave simply wouldn't be as high as that of a paid worker
- Under this view, using slave labor requires potentially costly supervision and lower levels of output per worker
- Slavery would be an inefficient institution that would have held back the southern economy

Igniting the Modern Debate over Slavery



See Tom Weiss's review on EH.net for a nice history of the controversy surrounding the book.

Fogel and Engerman's 'Principal Corrections'

Fogel and Engerman argued for ten 'corrections' to the traditional view of slavery:

- (1) Slave owners were not irrational, slaves were generally a highly profitable investment
- (2) There is no evidence that economic forces alone would have ended slavery
- (3) Slave owners anticipated future prosperity
- (4) Slave agriculture was more efficient than free agriculture
- (5) The typical slave field hand was more productive than his white counterpart

Fogel and Engerman's 'Principal Corrections'

- (6) Slavery was not incompatible with an industrial system
- (7) Slave breeding did not destroy the black family
- (8) The material conditions of slaves compared favorably with those of free industrial workers
- (9) Slave income was expropriated by owners but at a lower rate than previously assumed
- (10) The southern economy wasn't stagnating and was instead growing rapidly between 1840 and 1860

The Reaction to Time on the Cross

"[Time on the Cross is] simply shot through with egregious errors" – Paul David

"[Time on the Cross should be consigned] to the outermost ring of the scholar's hell, obscurity" – Thomas Haskell

"Time on the Cross is a failure" - Richard Sutch

What was so controversial?

- Several of Fogel and Engerman's points had already been conceded (the profitability of purchasing slaves, the role of slaves in industry and cities)
- The big controversy centered around the claims of efficiency and slave welfare
- The strongest objections were to the following assertions:
 - Slave plantations were more efficient than farms using free labor
 - The rate of expropriation was low and the material living conditions decent for slaves
 - Punishment was used less often than previously assumed
 - The family was the basic social unit under slavery

Slavery and Efficiency

Total Factor Productivity on Southern Farms Relative to Northern Farms (Northern

Farms=100), 1860		
Farm Size (number of slaves)	Old South	New South
0	98.4	112.7
1 to 15	103.3	127.2
16 to 50	124.9	176.1
51 or more	135.1	154.7
All slave farms	118.9	153.1
All farms	116.2	144.7

Slavery and Efficiency

Work hours per year for slaves and free farmers

Group	Hours per year
Southern slaves	2,800
Northern farmers	3,200
Corn belt farmers	3,365
Western dairy farmers	3,365

Where was the efficiency gain coming from?

- Slaves weren't more productive because they were working longer hours
- They were actually producing more with a shorter work year
- One part of this increased productivity may have been scale economies
- Another reason might be that large plantations effectively used a different labor technology
- Larger plantations using slave labor could employ the gang system

- There are two general approaches to using slave labor on a farm: the task system and the gang system
- The task system:
 - Each slave is assigned an amount of work to get done by the end of the day (perhaps longer)
 - The work might require several different actual tasks
 - Amount of work was proportional to ability (hand rating)
 - Example: the day's work might be to plow, seed and hoe a certain area of land
- The task system could be implemented on any size of farm

Hand Ratings

The field-hands are all divided into four classes, according to their physical capacities. The children beginning as "quarter-hands," advancing to "half-hands," and then to "three-quarter hands;" and, finally, when mature, and ablebodied, healthy and strong, to "full hands." As they decline in strength, from age, sickness, or other cause, they retrograde in the scale, and proportionately less labor is required of them. Many, of naturally weak frame, never are put among the full hands. Finally, the aged are left out at the annual classification, and no more regular field-work is required of them, although they are generally provided with some light, sedentary occupation. I saw one old woman

Frederick Law Olmsted, "A Journey in the Seaboard Slave States" (1856)

Some typical tasks for slaves (based on a full hand):

- Ditcher: 1,000 cubic feet in light meadow, 200 cubic feet in cypress swamp
- Sewing rice: 2 acres per day
- Reaping rice: .75 acres per day
- Cooper: 18 barrels per week
- Wood chopper: cut and split 1 cord per day

The basic characteristics of the gang system used on plantations:

- Slaves were divided into groups (gangs) with specialization of tasks
- These groups might be based on skill and ability
- The division of labor within a gang made a member responsible for a precise task but also made performance dependent on the actions of the others in the gang
- The gangs were typically composed of 10 to 20 slavehands and headed by a single driver
- In many ways the gang system was achieving for plantations what the assembly line would accomplish for manufacturing

There are a few different explanations for why the gang system could lead to greater efficiency:

- Sorting slaves by physical capability led to greater productivity through exploiting comparative advantages
- Direct supervision in gang system produced greater effort than incentive structure of task system
- Steady and intense pace of work under the gang system (keep up to the people ahead you, don't get in the way of people behind you)

Gang System Efficiency: Comparative Advantage

An example of comparative advantage:

- Suppose that a strong worker can plow one acre per day or pick 50 pounds of cotton per day
- Suppose that a weak worker can plow one quarter of an acre per day or pick 25 pounds of cotton per day
- Notice that the strong worker has an absolute advantage in both tasks and a comparative advantage in plowing

Gang System Efficiency: Comparative Advantage

Total output with both workers' time divided evenly between tasks:

$${\rm Plowed~acres} = \frac{1}{2}~{\rm day} \cdot 1~{\rm acre/day} + \frac{1}{2}~{\rm day} \cdot \frac{1}{4}~{\rm acre/day} = \frac{5}{8}~{\rm acres}$$

Cotton picked =
$$\frac{1}{2}$$
 day·50 lbs/day+ $\frac{1}{2}$ day·25lbs/day = 37.5 lbs

Gang System Efficiency: Comparative Advantage

Total output having weak worker specialized in picking and still aiming for $\frac{5}{8}$ acres plowed:

Plowed acres =
$$\frac{5}{8}$$
 day \cdot 1 acre/day + 0 = $\frac{5}{8}$ acres

Cotton picked =
$$\frac{3}{8}$$
 day-50 lbs/day+1 day-25 lbs/day = 43.75 lbs

Gang System Efficiency: Steady and Intense Pace

own supervisor.¹ Upon many estates of small dimensions the owner would lead the plow-gang, making his own furrow, and requiring the negroes to keep pace with him, while his son would do likewise with the hoe-gang. Or if the planter spared himself from the manual labor, he would oversee the work either in person or through a hired overseer, or in many cases through a reliable slave whom he constituted foreman or "driver" and vested with authority subordinate to his own. In some localities, as in most of the Carolina rice district, the negroes instead of being worked strictly in gangs were given tasks of hoeing or plowing a specified area for each day.

Uldrich Phillips, "The Origin and Growth of the Southern Black Belts" (1905)

Gang System Efficiency: Steady and Intense Pace



Slavery and Efficiency

Total Factor Productivity on Southern Farms Relative to Northern Farms (Northern

Farms=100), 1860				
Farm Size (number of slaves)	Old South	New South		
0	98.4	112.7		
1 to 15	103.3	127.2		
16 to 50	124.9	176.1		
51 or more	135.1	154.7		
All slave farms	118.9	153.1		
All farms	116.2	144.7		

The Gang System and Efficiency

- The gang system allowed plantations to achieve much higher levels of output per worker than farms using free labor
- Potential efficiency gains came from specialization, assigning slaves to tasks based on ability, enforcing an intense rate of work, and creating interdependence and tension within and between gangs
- A slave in a gang system produced as much output in 35 minutes as a farmer (free or slave) using traditional methods did in an hour
- The net result of the gang system was that total factor productivity was 39 percent higher for gang system plantations than for free farms

The Gang System and Efficiency

Marginal product of slave labor by gender, in percent

			Ratio of gang MPL to
	Task system	Gang system	task MPL
Male	.20	.25	1.25
Female	.08	.15	1.875

Results are from Toman (2005).

Why not use the gang system everywhere?

- First, the gang system worked well for only a handful of crops: hemp, sugar, tobacco, cotton and rice
- Of these crops, the efficiency gains of the gang system were greatest for sugar, still substantial for cotton and rice, and relatively small for tobacco
- This limited the geographic area in which large slave plantations would have a big efficiency edge

Why not use the gang system everywhere?

- Another problem with the adoption of the gang system was that it was hard to implement with free labor
- The work was awful, when plantations tried to get free laborers to work in a gang system, they had to pay a premium of \$75 a year
- Problem is, the gains in efficiency only amounted to roughly \$23 a year

Getting the gang system to function

- So the efficiency gains were potentially large from using the gang system
- However, the work was so grueling that it wouldn't survive in the absence of slavery
- How did owners get the slaves to maintain such high levels of effort?
- Both punishment and rewards were used
- Punishment included whippings and loss of privileges
- Rewards included days off, material goods, better jobs

Getting the gang system to function

Stefano Fenoaltea's model of slavery and supervision:

- Distinguishes between effort-intensive and care-intensive production
- Punishment can get higher work effort at the expense of carefulness
- Rewards are better for achieving greater levels of carefulness
- Therefore, punishment gets used in effort-intensive work (plantation agriculture)
- Rewards get used in care-intensive work (real and human-capital intensive work)
- Explains patterns of slavery and patterns of punishment vs rewards across sectors

Getting the gang system to function


"[S]ince the predominant response to Emancipation was the breaking up of the gangs, rather than their reconstitution with free labor, the superior productivity of the gang slaves appears attributable specifically to their subjection to the lash, and not to conventional economies of scale."

-Stefano Fenoaltea


Rates of Return on Southern Slaves, 1830-1860 (Evans, 1962)

	, ,
Period	Rate of Return
1830-35	11.25
1836-40	9.5
1841-45	16.4
1846-50	14.8
1851-55	12.9
1856-60	10.8

Average Accumulated Value (in dollars) of Income Expropriated from Slaves




Capitalized Rent in an 18-year-old Slave




Announcements

- Cancelled class/office hours: Thursday, November 15th (I'll be at a conference in CA)
- Monday office hours will be pushed back to 1pm-2:30pm
- Start working on your empirical project due November 30th
- Readings for the rest of the semester:
 - Logan (2018) on Reconstruction
 - Abramitzky, Boustan and Eriksson (2014) on immigration (your referee report)
 - Collins and Wanamaker (2014) on the Great Migration


Distribution of Slaves



Distribution of Slaves



Igniting the Modern Debate over Slavery



See Tom Weiss's review on EH.net for a nice history of the controversy surrounding the book.

Fogel and Engerman's 'Principal Corrections'


Fogel and Engerman argued for ten 'corrections' to the traditional view of slavery:

- (1) Slave owners were not irrational, slaves were generally a highly profitable investment
- (2) There is no evidence that economic forces alone would have ended slavery
- (3) Slave owners anticipated future prosperity
- (4) Slave agriculture was more efficient than free agriculture
- (5) The typical slave field hand was more productive than his white counterpart

Fogel and Engerman's 'Principal Corrections'

- (6) Slavery was not incompatible with an industrial system
- (7) Slave breeding did not destroy the black family
- (8) The material conditions of slaves compared favorably with those of free industrial workers
- (9) Slave income was expropriated by owners but at a lower rate than previously assumed
- (10) The southern economy wasn't stagnating and was instead growing rapidly between 1840 and 1860

Capitalized Rent in an 18-year-old Slave



The Welfare of Slaves

- The data suggest that slavery was both profitable and would potentially continue to be profitable: slavery was working out well for slaveholders
- Another big question, with as much debate surrounding it as the efficiency and profitability of slavery, is how slaves fared under the system
- From the owner's perspective, healthy slaves were important for productivity and happy slaves may also have improved productivity
- Concerns over productivity would guide decisions about the provision of food and material goods and the extent of physical abuse taking place

The Welfare of Slaves

"I am very certain, from an attentive observation to this subject, that a negro deprived of a meat diet is not able to endure the labor that those can perform who are liberally supplied with it; and that the master who gives his field hands a half a pound of meat per day and two quarts of meal...is better compensated by slave labor than those who give the ordinary quantity."


-Virginia planter, 1837

Slave Diets

A Comparison of Diets (pounds per day)


A comparison of Diets (pounds per day)			
		Fogel and	
	Least-cost	Engerman	Sutch slave
	diet	slave diet	diet
Pork		0.31	0.53
Beef		0.15	0.1
Mutton		0.01	
Butter		0.01	0.01
Milk	0.6	0.6	0.41
Sweet potatoes	0.25	1.12	0.72
Irish potatoes		0.08	0.06
Cowpeas	0.58	0.35	0.12
Corn	1.74	1.78	2.23
Wheat		0.12	0.12
Cost per day (cents)	4.4	8.2	8.7

Slave Diets




This calorie level is only an estimate of your needs. Monitor your body weight to see if you need to adjust your calorie intake.

Slave Heights Relative to Other Groups



Slave Longevity Relative to Other Groups





The Health of Slave Children

- Along the dimensions of food consumption, adult height and longevity slaves didn't appear to be drastically behind other population groups
- Where the welfare of the slave population does look quite poor is among newborns and young children
- Newborns had very low birth weights, there were high rates of infant mortality and health problems persisted through early childhood
- Possible explanations:
 - Work patterns of mothers
 - Disease environment
 - Diets of slave children

Slave Mortality Rates

Mortality Rates per Thousand in the Antebellum Period

Age group	Slaves	Entire US population
0	350	179
1 to 4	201	93
5 to 9	54	28
10 to 14	37	19
15 to 19	35	28
20 to 24	40	39


The Health of Slave Children




The Health of Slave Children




The Unusual Growth Patterns of Slave Children



The Unusual Growth Patterns of Slave Children



The Unusual Growth Patterns of Slave Children



The Unusual Growth Patterns of Slave Children

- So it appears that slave children experienced very poor nutrition but then substantial catch-up growth in their late teens
- This is not simply a pattern of undernourished populations (developing countries with small children tend to have small teens and adults)
- Steckel argues it is a product of poor nutrition resulting from owners' investment decisions
- The return to additional productivity from better nutrition was considered less than the cost of that nutrition for children

Another Explanation: Selection

Mortality Rates per Thousand in the Antebellum Period

Age group	Slaves	Entire US population
0	350	179
1 to 4	201	93
5 to 9	54	28
10 to 14	37	19
15 to 19	35	28
20 to 24	40	39

Is there now consensus among economists?

SLAVERY


	\boldsymbol{A}	P	D	14. Slavery was a system irrationally kept in existence by
\boldsymbol{E}	2	4	93	plantation owners who failed to perceive or were indifferent to
\boldsymbol{H}	3	8	90	their best economic interests.
Pr	20/46			
%	100/100			
	A	P	D	15. The slave system was economically moribund on the eve of
E	0	2	98	the Civil War.
H	3	3	95	
Pr	54/52			
%	98/92			
	A	P	D	16. Slave agriculture was efficient compared with free
E	48	24	28	agriculture. Economies of scale, effective management, and
H	30	35	35	intensive utilization of labor and capital made southern slave
Pr	67/49			agriculture considerably more efficient than nonslave southern
%	100/95			farming.
	A	P	\boldsymbol{D}	17. The material (rather than psychological) conditions of the
\boldsymbol{E}	23	35	42	lives of slaves compared favorably with those of free industrial
H	22	19	58	workers in the decades before the Civil War.
Pr	75/85			
%	94/92			

From Whaples (1995) "Where is there consensus among American economic historians? The results of a survey on forty propositions"

Long Run Consequences of Slavery

- One reason for assessing the material conditions of slaves on the eve of the Civil War is to think about convergence in outcomes after the war
- Knowing the gap in economic and health outcomes at the time of emancipation is critical for knowing whether progress was made in closing that gap
- We'll consider a few different dimensions of how progress was or was not made after the Civil War

Long Run Consequences of Slavery




Slavery and the Economic Development of Africa

- Before focusing on the US, let's look at Africa
- Slavery as an institution had profound impacts on the development of Africa
- Consider Nathan Nunn's "The Long Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trade"
- Nunn looks at the effects of slave trading in Africa on modern economic outcomes of African countries
- He explores the argument of whether slave trades and colonialism are an explanation of African underdevelopment
- His basic story: slavery's impact on governmental institutions and social institutions helps explain the persistence of bad institutions and poor economic outcomes in parts of Africa today

Quick Review of the Slave Trade in Africa

- Slave trade lasted from roughly 1400 to 1900
- Colonial rule in Africa lasted between 1885 to 1960
- Four different slave trades:
 - Trans-Atlantic: slaves taken from West Africa,
 West-Central Africa and Eastern Africa to European colonies in the New World
 - Trans-Saharan: slaves taken from south of the Saharan desert to Northern Africa
 - Red Sea: slaves taken from inland Africa and shipped to Middle East and India
 - Indian Ocean: slaves taken from Eastern Africa and shipped to Middle East, India and plantation islands in the Indian Ocean

Quick Overview of the Slave Trade



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Quick Overview of the Slave Trade


- Over 18 million slaves were exported (12 million were through trans-Atlantic trade)
- Estimated that by 1850, Africa's population was half of what it would have been without the slave trade
- Slave trade led to social and ethnic fragmentation, political instability, weakening of states, corruption of judicial institutions

Countries Exporting the Most Slaves, 1400-1900

ESTIMATED TOTAL SLAVE EXPORTS BETWEEN 1400 AND 1900 BY COUNTRY

Isocode	Country name	Trans- Atlantic	Indian Ocean	Trans- Saharan	Red Sea	All slave trades
AGO	Angola	3,607,020	0	0	0	3,607,020
NGA	Nigeria	1,406,728	0	555,796	59,337	2,021,859
GHA	Ghana	1,614,793	0	0	0	1,614,793
ETH	Ethiopia	0	200	813,899	633,357	1,447,455
SDN	Sudan	615	174	408,261	454,913	863,962
MLI	Mali	331,748	0	509,950	0	841,697
ZAR	Democratic Republic of Congo	759,468	7,047	0	0	766,515
MOZ	Mozambique	382,378	243,484	0	0	625,862
TZA	Tanzania	10,834	523,992	0	0	534,826
TCD	Chad	823	0	409,368	$118,\!673$	528,862


Countries Exporting the Most Slaves, 1400-1900




Countries Exporting the Most Slaves, 1400-1900



Slaves Exports and Modern GDP per Capita




Economic Growth for Countries with the Lowest and Highest Slave Exports




The Long Term Effects of Slavery

- Clearly some areas of Africa were far more affected by slavery than others
- Today, those areas that exported the most slaves are less economically developed
- So why do we get persistent effects of slavery well after the slave trade ended?
- Nunn's answer is that the slave trade had profound impacts on several features of institutional development:
 - Ethnic fractionalization
 - State development
 - Levels of distrust


Slaves Exports and Modern Ethnic Fractionalization




Slaves Exports and 19th Century State Development




Slaves Exports and Modern Distrust




Beyond Africa




Beyond Africa



Beyond Africa



Percentage of votes for the NSDAP in the German National Election of 1928 (Voigtlander and Voth, 2012)






Fig. 1. Trust.

From Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) "Who Trusts Others?"

Table 1 Descriptive statistics^a

	Means [1]	Correlations with trust [2]
Trust	0.40	1
Confidence in banks & financial institutions	0.27	0.06*
Confidence in major companies	0.25	0.14*
Confidence in organized religion	0.30	0.04*
Confidence in education	0.32	0.01
Confidence in executive branch of federal government	0.17	0.06*
Confidence in organized labor	0.12	-0.03*
Confidence in press	0.19	0.01
Confidence in medicine	0.49	0.06*
Confidence in television	0.15	-0.04*
Confidence in supreme court	0.32	0.12*
Confidence in scientific community	0.40	0.15*
Confidence in congress	0.14	0.02
Confidence in military	0.35	-0.03*
Gini	0.41	-0.10*
Racial fragmentation	0.36	-0.10*
Ethnic fragmentation	0.67	-0.03*

a Notes: *denotes significance at the 1 percent level.

From Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) "Who Trusts Others?"

DATA PRESENTED BY DR. B. C. BROWN

Classification of Cases in Tuskegee Study

	Controls	Syphilitic	Total
Classification at initial examination	200	411	611
Cases added in 1938-1939		14	14
Total - Original classification	200	425	625
Controls infected during observation Controls reclassified as syphilitic	-9	+9	•
on basis of additional history	-1	+1	
on basis of treponemal tests	-8	+8	
Total - Final classification	182	443	625
Known dead - Number	97	276	373
Percent	53.3	62.3	59.7
Remainder -	85	167	252
Examined in 1968			
Number	36	53	89
Percent	42.4	31.7	35.3




FIGURE 4: EVENT STUDY ON UTILIZATION Panel A: Black vs. White Males Panel B: Black Men vs. Black Women

From Alsan and Wanamaker (2017) "Tuskegee and the Health of Black Men"


1972 1973 Year

1971 1972

FIGURE 5: EVENT STUDY ON MORTALITY



Panel B: Black Men vs. Black Women



From Alsan and Wanamaker (2017) "Tuskegee and the Health of Black Men"


Announcements


- Don't forget about the empirical project due November 30th
- I'll be able to respond to emails throughout the Thanksgiving break if you have any questions on it
- Regular office hours next week for any last minute questions
- Readings for the rest of the semester:
 - Logan (2018) on Reconstruction
 - Abramitzky, Boustan and Eriksson (2014) on immigration (your referee report)
 - Collins and Wanamaker (2014) on the Great Migration





Fourteenth Amendment, adopted 1868





- To think about the effects of black enfranchisement during Reconstruction, let's look at Logan (2018)
- Logan wants to think about how the election of black officials affected local government finance
- Before we get into the details, let's quickly look at a modern case cited by Logan
- We'll consider Beach and Jones (2017) "Gridlock: Ethnic Diversity in Government and the Provision of Public Goods"

Race and Modern Elections




FIGURE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF PER CAPITA PUBLIC GOOD SPENDING PATTERNS (RD sample)

Notes: Sample is restricted to the set of cities that ever experience a close election between a modal and non-modal candidate (i.e., an election that was decided by a margin of less than 7.1 percent). A modal candidate is a candidate whose ethnicity matches the city's modal ethnicity.

Race and Modern Elections




FIGURE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF NON-MODAL MARGIN OF VICTORY

Notes: A modal candidate is a candidate whose ethnicity matches the city's modal ethnicity. The "Non-modal margin" of victory is simply the non-modal vote share — modal vote share. The dashed lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval around the estimate.

Race and Modern Elections




FIGURE 3. BINNED SCATTER PLOT OF PER CAPITA SPENDING AND THE NON-MODAL CANDIDATE'S MARGIN OF VICTORY

Notes: Sample restricted to the set of cities that ever experience an election between a modal and non-modal candidate (i.e., an election that was decided by a margin of less than 7.1 percent). A modal candidate is a candidate whose ethnicity matches the city's modal ethnicity. Each "public goods" is simply total expenditures minus expenditures on "government administration" and debt repayment. The "public goods" category therefore includes all spending on roads, parks, police protection, sewerage, public transportation, etc.

Race and Modern Elections

TABLE 6—THE IMPACT OF A GROUP-SPECIFIC VICTORY ON LOG PUBLIC GOOD SPENDING PER CAPITA

	Asian (1)	Black (2)	Hispanic (3)	White (4)
Group wins	-0.034	0.081	0.036	-0.058
	(0.075)	(0.088)	(0.047)	(0.044)
Observations R^2	110	128	354	377
	0.974	0.958	0.915	0.935

Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered at the council level) are in parentheses. Column 1 is restricted to the set of cities that ever experience a close election between an Asian and non-Asian candidate. Column 2 is restricted to the set of cities that ever experience a close election between a black and nonblack candidate. Column 3 is restricted to the set of cities that ever experience a close election between a Hispanic and non-Hispanic candidate. Column 4 is restricted to the set of cities that ever experience a close election between a white and nonwhite candidate. Each regression includes city and year fixed effects. Close elections are defined as elections that were decided by a margin of less than 7.1 percent. All specifications include year and city fixed effects. The "group wins" indicator is also interacted with margin of victory.




Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of Black Officials During Reconstruction. Source: Foner (1996)

Table 1: Summary Statistics for Black Officials During Reconstruction

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.
Entered Office	1331	1869.016	2.677765
Left Office	1331	1873.63	5.650746
Birth Year	1096	1832.479	11.56974
Death Year	366	1893.825	17.96578
Literate	1331	0.642957	0.479295
Victim of Violence	1331	0.104603	0.306147
Born a Slave	1331	0.288703	0.453318
Property Owner (>\$100)	1331	0.233612	0.423276
Executive	1331	0.334728	0.47206
Legislative	1331	0.567643	0.495576
Judicial	1331	0.094142	0.292128

Note: Data come from Foner (1996) for each unique black officeholder.

Table 3: OLS Estimates of 1870 County Taxes Per Capita

	Dependent	Variable : 1870	County Taxe	s per Capita
	I	II	Ш	IV
Black Officials Per County	0.0993***	.0993***	0.0986***	0.0925***
	(0.0106)	(0.0105)	(0.0132)	(0.0133)
Total Value of Farms 1870	6.11e-08***	8.93e-08***	8.51e-08***	7.24e-08***
	(1.88e-08)	(2.03e-08)	(2.01e-08)	(2.06e-08)
Segregation Measure	0.214	0.3028	0.271	0.348
	(0.318)	(0.352)	(0.349)	(0.348)
Percent Black	0.251	1.109***	0.988***	0.903***
	(0.214)	(0.252)	(0.252)	(0.253)
Total Population	-2.77e-06	0.0000279***	-1.72e-05	-1.48e-05
	(2.98e-06)	(7.66e-06)	(1.28e-05)	(1.27e-05)
Manufacturing Wages		-1.27e-06***	-1.77e-06***	-1.80e-06***
		(2.45e-07)	(2.69e-07)	(2.68e-07)
Value of Manufacturing Output		3.37e-07***	3.68e-07***	3.67e-07***
		(6.25e-08)	(6.23e-08)	(6.21e-08)
Number Illiterate		-0.0001638***	-9.40e-05***	-8.66e-05***
		(0.0000249)	(2.94e-05)	(2.94e-05)
Rail Access?		0.011499	0.0382	0.0404
		(0.085)	(0.0823)	(0.0820)
Water Access?		0.04222	0.0460	0.0408
		(0.08053)	(0.0800)	(0.0797)
Urban?		0.0231714	0.106	0.0680
		(0.17859)	(0.178)	(0.178)
County Wealth			4.95e-08***	4.89e-08***
			(1.13e-08)	(1.12e-08)
Republican Vote Share 1868 Presid	lent			0.00123***
				(0.000462)
R-Squared	0.443	0.5139	0.525	0.529

Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

N= 974 (Column I). N=825 (Columns II-IV). All Regressions include state fixed effects.

- We have an endogeneity problem here, what type of counties decide to elect black politicians?
- It could be the type of county, and not the politician, driving results
- The Beach and Jones approach of close elections won't work here
- Instead, Logan is going to take and instrumental variables approach

- The basic idea is to find something correlated with electing a black politician but uncorrelated with the county traits we're worried about
- Logan is going to use the number of free black residents in a county prior to the Civil War
- Estimation takes place in two steps:
 - First, regress the number of black politicians on the 1860 free black population and use the results to predict the number of black politicians
 - Second, regress spending outcomes on the predicted number of black politicians

Table 5: IV Estimates for Black Elected Officials

·	I	II	III	IV
OLS				
Black Officials Per County	0.0993***	.0993***	0.0986***	0.0925***
	(0.0106)	(0.0105)	(0.0132)	(0.0133)
First Stage				
Free Blacks in 1860	0.00275***	0.00159***	0.00118***	0.00115***
	(0.000216)	(0.000236)	(0.000239)	(0.000236)
F-Statistic on Excluded Instrument	161.8	45.9	24.2	23.9
IV				
Black Officials Per County	0.197***	0.24006***	0.207***	0.205**
	(0.0289)	(0.0574)	(0.0787)	(0.0802)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
Local Economic Conditions		X	X	X
County Wealth			X	X
Republican Vote Share (1868)				X

Robust standard errors in parentheses. **** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 N= 825. All regressions include total value of farms in 1870, Logan-Parman segregation measure, percent black, and total population. Column II includes manufacturing wages, value of manufacturing output, number illiterate, rail access, water access, and urban county. Column III includes county wealth. Column IV includes Republican vote Share in the 1868 Presidential Election. All regressions include state fixed effects.

Table 7: Effects of Politicians by Branch of Government


Panel A: Judicial Officials			
Dependent Variable:	$OLS-1870\ County$	First Stage Officials	IV - 1870 County
	Taxes Per Capita	Per County	Taxes Per Capita
Judicial Officials Per County	0.0659		3.494
	(0.0608)		(3.005)
Free Blacks 1860		6.77e-05	
		(5.39e-05)	
F-Statistic on Excluded Instrument		1.578	
Panel B: Executive Officials			
Dependent Variable:	OLS 1870 County	First Stage Officials	IV 1870 County
	Taxes Per Capita	Per County	Taxes Per Capita
Executive Officials Per County	0.123***		1.006
	(0.0233)		(0.638)
Free Blacks 1860		0.000235*	
		(0.000139)	
F-Statistic on Excluded Instrument		2.883	
Panel C: Legislative Officials			
Dependent Variable:	OLS 1870 County	First Stage Officials	IV 1870 County
	Taxes Per Capita	Per County	Taxes Per Capita
Legislative Officials Per County	0.139***	-	0.283***
	(0.0232)		(0.109)
Free Blacks 1860		0.000837***	
		(0.000135)	
F-Statistic on Excluded Instrument		38.204	

Robust standard errors in parentheses. **** p-0.01, *** p-0.05, ** p-0.1. Note N=825 in all regressions. Regressions include Republican vote share in 1868 Presidential Election, total value of frams, Logan-Parman Segregation, Total population, percent black, manufacturing wages, value of manufacturing output, number illiterate, rail access, water access, urban county, county wealth, state fixed effects.

Table 11: Exposure to Black Officials and Education

Panel A:				
		Black Lite	eracy Rate	
Black Officials in County	-0.0221***	-0.0217***	-0.0193***	-0.0198***
	(0.00388)	(0.00413)	(0.00365)	(0.00383)
Exposed to Schooling	0.183***	0.184***	0.396***	0.388***
	(0.0169)	(0.0170)	(0.00270)	(0.00274)
Black Officials * Exposed to Schooling	0.0368***	0.0361***	0.0340***	0.0334***
	(0.00649)	(0.00640)	(0.00636)	(0.00629)
Observations	48,376	48,376	48,376	48,376
R-squared	0.099	0.116	0.177	0.194
State Effects		X		X
Birth Cohort Effects			X	X
Percent Effect on Black Literacy Rate	6.85	6.72	6.33	6.22

Race, Elections and the End of Reconstruction



Race, Elections and the End of Reconstruction

Table 8: 1880 Taxes and Changes in Taxes 1870-1880

Panel A: 1880 Per capita Cor	unty Taxes		
Dependent Variable:	OLS 1880 County	First Stage Officials	IV 1880 County
	Taxes Per Capita	Per County	Taxes Per Capita
Black Officials Per County	0.0309***		-0.0902**
	(0.0068)		(0.0460)
Free Blacks 1860		0.0012***	
		(0.0002)	
F-Statistic on Excluded Instr	ument	24.45	
Panel B: Change in Per Capi	ta Taxes, 1870-1880		
Dependent Variable:	OLS 1870-1880 County	First Stage Officials	IV 1870-1880 County
	Taxes Per Capita	Per County	Taxes Per Capita
Black Officials Per County	-0.0129***		-0.0629***
	(0.0030)		(0.0199)
Free Blacks 1860		0.0012***	
		(0.0002)	

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, *** p<0.05, ** p<0.1. Note: N=825 in all regressions. Regressions include Republican vote share in 1868 Presidential Election, total value of farms, Logan-Parman Segregation, Total population, percent black, manufacturing wages, value of manufacturing output, number illiterate, rail access, water access, urban county, county wealth, state fixed effects.

Black Outcomes After Reconstruction



Black Outcomes After Reconstruction



Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896


Black Outcomes After Reconstruction



Brown v. Board of Education, 1954

- During the Jim Crow era, the separate but equal doctrine led to large gaps in access to opportunity
- Particularly bad for black economic mobility were the racial gaps in school quality
- Let's take a quick look at a dissertation by Baker (2014)
- In particular, Baker has a really interesting way to get at the way public funds were allocated between black and white schools in the South during the Jim Crow era


Figure 1.2: Trends in School Quality in Georgia by Race, 1900-1930



Sources: Calculated using data collected from the Georgia Department of Education. An-

nual Report of the Department of Education to General Assembly of the State of Georgia, 1901-1931. The number of teachers with normal training is not available after 1922. The length of the school term was not reported separately by race prior to 1909.

Figure 1.3: Racial Gap in Years of Schooling by Birth Cohort in Georgia







Figure 2.1: Sources of County School Revenues by Year

Notes: Displays the county-level mean percentage of total school revenues per pupil from various sources. Source: Reports of the Georgia Department of Education, various years.

Figure 2.2: Percent Change in County-Level Appropriations around Census Years



Note: Each new school census caused varied changes in appropriations from the State School Fund at the county level in adjustment years. Each bar represents the percent change in state appropriations received by a county as a result of the relevant census update. Source: Reports of the Georgia Department of Education, various years.

Table 2.4: Estimates of the Effect of Budget Shocks on Various Expenditures

1902 to 1904					
	$\Delta Total~Exp~PP$	$\Delta Teacher~PP$	$\Delta Support PP$	$\Delta Super.PP$	$\Delta Capital\ PP$
$\Delta Approp\ PP$	0.638***	0.484***	0.042***	0.020***	0.084**
Constant	(0.10) 12.647***	(0.11) -10.897***	(0.01) 2.922***	(0.01) 1.468***	(0.04) 3.568**
Constant	(3.69)	(4.12)	(0.57)	(0.28)	(1.42)
R-squared	0.476	0.215	0.223	0.336	0.040
Counties Dependent Variable:	127	127	127	127	127
Mean	16.891	-8.394	3.286	1.705	3.787
Std. Dev.	56.739	51.725	7.127	3.883	16.138
1912 to 1914					
	$\Delta Total~Exp~PP$	$\Delta Teacher~PP$	$\Delta Support PP$	$\Delta Super.PP$	$\Delta Capital\ PP$
$\Delta Approp PP$	0.839***	0.357**	0.039**	0.041***	0.117
Constant	(0.32) 53.388**	(0.15) 14.093	(0.02)	(0.01) 0.415	(0.20)
Constant	(23.20)	(10.55)	(1.18)	(0.88)	(15.16)
R-squared	0.158	0.230	0.169	0.192	0.006
Counties	130	130	135	135	135
Dependent Variable: Mean	-5.960	-21.446	-3.530	-2.136	8.027
Std. Dev.	237.989	113.208	12.309	9.285	144.047
1922 to 1924					
	$\Delta Total \stackrel{(1)}{Exp} PP$	$\Delta Teacher~PP$	$\Delta Support PP$	$\Delta Super.PP$	$\Delta Capital\ PP$
$\Delta Approp PP$	0.972	0.867***	0.046**	0.027*	-0.186
Constant	(0.76) 175 474**	(0.26) 20.290	(0.02) 3.053*	(0.02)	(0.61) -69.002
Constant	(71.22)	(24.31)	(1.73)	(1.53)	(56.97)
R-squared	0.016	0.200	0.210	0.175	0.014
Counties Dependent Variable:	146	146	146	146	146
Mean Variable:	185.063	61.380	6.811	6.339	-102.412
Std. Dev.	742.902	281.224	20.199	17.388	593.713

Notes: All regressions control for the contemporaneous change in enrollment. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All monetary figures are nominal.


^{***} p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2.7: Estimates of the Effect of Budget Shocks on Expenditures by Race

1902 to 1904						
	(1) $\Delta Teac$	her PP				
$\Delta Approp PP$	0.408*	1007 1 1				
	(0.24)					
Black	-19.154 (14.88)					
Black X $\Delta Approp PP$	-0.151					
Constant	(0.29)					
Constant	(10.52)					
Local Tax Controls	NO					
R-squared Counties	0.096 206					
1912 to 1914	200					
.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	$\Delta Teac$	her PP	ΔCap	ital PP	$\Delta Total$	ExpPP
$\Delta Approp PP$	0.823***	0.800***	0.106	0.081	0.930***	0.881***
Black	(0.21) -50.942**	(0.20) -45.364*	(0.34) -11.569	(0.34) -5.100	(0.34) -62.511	(0.34) -50.464
DI LVAA DD	(24.29)	(24.33)	(40.30)	(40.70)	(40.57) -0.777**	(40.43)
Black X $\Delta Approp PP$	-0.681***	-0.643***	-0.096 (0.38)	(0.38)	(0.38)	-0.694* (0.38)
Constant	41.512**	35.380**	15.724	9.802	57.237*	45.182
	(17.59)	(17.62)	(29.18)	(29.47)	(29.37)	(29.28)
Local Tax Controls R-squared	NO 0.166	YES 0.186	NO 0.001	YES 0.009	NO 0.078	YES 0.109
Counties	254	254	254	254	254	254
1922 to 1924						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		her PP		ital PP		Exp PP
$\Delta Approp PP$	1.370***	1.228***	-0.977 (0.81)	-1.102 (0.82)	(0.93)	(0.126
Black	-36.319	-22.280	122.333	137.282	86.015	115.002
Black X Approp PP	(37.31) -0.810**	(37.85)	(103.33) 1.690*	(106.30) 1.831*	(117.96) 0.880	(120.89) 1.152
	(0.36)	(0.37)	(1.01)	(1.04)	(1.15)	(1.18)
Constant	37.281 (28.34)	(28.57)	-122.506 (78.48)	-136.757* (80.25)	-85.226 (89.59)	-115.772 (91.26)
Local Tax Controls	NO	YES	NO.46)	YES	NO	YES
R-squared	0.178	0.203	0.032	0.034	0.038	0.048
Counties	292	292	292	292	292	292


Notes: All regressions control for the change in race-specific enrollment and the change in total enrollment at the county level. Regressions represented by columns (2), (4), and (6) control for the change in local tax revenues per pupil and its interaction with the indicator variable for race. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All monetary figures are nominal.

- Baker's results regarding the funding of public schools by local governments are rather depressing
- Given this failure of local governments to provide adequate education for black students, there was a private response
- One major initiative was the Julius Rosenwald Fund, funding construction of 5000 schools for black students between 1912 and 1933
- Were these types of interventions successful in closing black-white schooling gaps?
- Let's take a look and Carruthers and Wanamaker (2013)





East Suffolk Elementary School






Table 4

Eq. (2) results: Impact of private Rosenwald contributions changes on local tax revenues and total spending in African-American and white public schools.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	African-American School spending	White School spending	Local Tax revenues
å ^k Current Rosenwald contributions	0.877***	1.335**	-1.1E-04
	(0.159)	(0.518)	(0.001)
	[0.565, 1.189]	[0.319, 2.351]	[-0.002, 0.002]
α̂k, Rosenwald contributions, one year lag	0.023	1.656	1.6E - 04
	(0.163)	(1.284)	(0.001)
	[-0.296, 0.343]	[-0.862, 4.174]	[-0.002, 0.002]
ά ^k _{−2} Rosenwald contributions, two year lag	-0.306*	0.940	-0.001
	(0.176)	(0.980)	(0.001)
	[-0.561, 0.040]	[-0.981, 2.861]	[-0.003, 0.002]
α̃_2 Rosenwald contributions, three year lag	-0.242	0.122	0.002
	(0.152)	(0.585)	(0.002)
	[-0.541, 0.056]	[-1.026, 1.269]	[-0.001, 0.006]
ἀ ^k A Rosenwald contributions, four year lag	-0.188	-0.113	0.002*
	(0.120)	(0.650)	(0.001)
	[-0.422, 0.046]	[-1.387, 1.162]	[-4.8E-04, 0.005
x ^k Rosenwald contributions, five year lag	-0.097	-0.829	9.0E — 05
	(0.126)	(0.592)	(0.001)
	[-0.344, 0.149]	[-1.990, 0.332]	[-0.001, 0.001]
1 (county-years, 1916-1940)	3444	3444	3529
Adjusted R ²	0.09	0.09	0.10

Notes: The estimating equation is

 $\Delta Y_{ct}^k = \alpha^k \Delta R_{ct} + \sum_{s=1}^{5} \alpha_{-s}^k \Delta R_{ct-s} + \Delta \mathbf{X}_{ct} \beta^k + \theta_c^k + \theta_t^k + \epsilon_{ct}^k$

where Y₁, represents total school expenditures, by race, and R₂ measures total private expenditures on Rosenwald initiatives, df is a county fixed effect and df is a year fixed effect. Unreported control variables include changes in enrollment (by race and lagged one year), and changes in Census variables (interpolated between decential years total population back population share, crop value per capita, and percent of land devoted to a griculture). Spending regressions also control for changes in revenues from local taxes (lagged one year). Regressions are weighted by total, county-wide Rosenwald contributions from 1921–1933 and estimated with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered within counties. Standard errors are in parenthese below each expenditure coefficient and 98% confidence intervisal are in brackets.

*** indicates statistical significance at 99% confidence (with respect to zero), ** at 95%, and * at 90%.

Table 10 Eq. (7) results: school spending, school attendance, and literacy.

Outcome population	Attending or enrolled in school, 1910–1930			
	African-American	White		
Per-pupil real expenditures	0.001*	-5.20E-6		
(current)	(0.001)	(-2.4E-4)		
n (census respondents)	23,135	29,102		
Adjusted R-squared	0.09	0.11		
Outcome population	Can read and write, 193	1930		
	African-American	White		
Per-pupil real expenditures	0.001*	1.3E-4*		
(average over age 7-13)	(5.5E-4)	(7.5E - 5)		
n (census respondents)	6266	9347		
Adjusted R-squared	0.10	0.06		

Notes: The estimating equation is

$$Y_{ict}^k = \alpha^k + S_{ct}^k \psi^k + \mathbf{X}_i^k \beta^k + \theta_c^k + \theta_t^k + \varepsilon_{ict}^k$$

where Y_{ict}^k is school attendance for age 7–17 respondents in the 1910–1930 U.S. Census, by race (top panel) or reading and writing literacy for age 15–23 respondents in 1930 (bottom panel). S_{ct} is per-pupil spending in a respondent's county of residence. X_i is a vector of individual characteristics, θ_i^k is a county fixed effect and θ_i^k is a year fixed effect. *** indicates statistical significance at 99% confidence (with respect to zero), ** at 95%, and * at 90%.

- Carruthers and Wanamaker find that Rosenwald funds did increase contemporaneous black schooling resources
- However, they find no long-term gains in spending in response to funds
- Why? Funds crowded out public expenditures and were diverted to white schools
- Better news is that Rosenwald beneficiaries realized human capital gains that outpaced those for white students
- This may be due to where white and black students were on their human capital production function