Slavery and the American Economy



A Brief History of Slavery

- Slaves came to the New World beginning in the early 1500s on French and Spanish expeditions
- Slaves first arrived in British North America in Virginia in 1619 (just a few miles from here)
- ▶ The trans-Atlantic slave trade continued until 1808 when it was banned by both the United States and England
- ▶ The internal slave trade continued until the Civil War
- Individual states abolish slavery at different times during the 18th and 19th centuries
- ▶ Slavery is officially abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865

The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade



About the latter end of August, a Dutch man of Warr of the burden of a 160 tunnes arrived at Point-Comfort . . . He brought not any thing but 20. and odd Negroes, who the Governor and Cape Marchant bought for victualls (whereof he was in greate need as he prtended) at the best and easyest rates they could. . . .-John Rolf to Sir Edwin Sandys, 1619

A Brief Local History of Slavery



A Brief Local History of Slavery



The Lemon Project

A Brief Local History of Slavery

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Slavery Within the United States



Slave Populations in the South, 1790-1860



Slavery Within the United States



Slaveholders by State and Number of Slaves



From Historical Statistics of the United States based on federal census slave schedules

Distribution of Slaves



Distribution of Slaves



Some Legal Aspects of Slavery

- Slaves were considered property and the laws governing them were developed from laws regarding personal property, animals, servants and employees
- Laws existed to protect slaves from excessive abuse but still allowed greater punishment than for other employees
- Initially manumission was legal as it was seen as an inherent right of property ownership but by the 1830s, many southern states limited manumission
- ▶ Laws regarding slave sales differed from many other types of contracts
- ▶ In particular, slave sellers were often required to disclose known defects and were liable for unknown defects
- Laws were often harsh for injuring someone else's slave

Slavery and the Intersection of Law and Economics

The laws governing slavery were driven in part by economics, some would also provide the foundations for several aspects of consumer protection and contract law that we consider standard today. A few examples:

- Manumission over time states limited manumission, recognizing that owners had an incentive to free slaves once they were no longer productive
- Laws requiring sellers to disclose defects some of the first laws recognizing problems of asymmetric information in markets
- Punishment slaves could be punished more severely than free laborers, part of the justification for this was a difference in available incentive schemes
- Safety laws made employers of hired slaves and common carriers liable for physical injury to slaves

Studying Slavery

- Because slaves were bought and sold and worked on plantations that kept detailed records, quite a bit of data is available to economic historians
- Data is available both for the market for slaves and for the work slaves did on plantations
- Among the data sources economic historians have used to study slavery:
 - Census slave schedules
 - Slave ship manifests
 - Records of slave sales
 - Probate records
 - Plantation ledgers
 - Slave narratives

Census Slave Schedules

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Probate and Auction Records

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Probate and Auction Records

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Plantation Records

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The Federal Writers' Project Slave Narratives

page - 3 220

that would 'commodate a whole fence rail, it wus so big, an' had pot hooks, pots, big old iron ones, an' everything er round to cook on. Aunt Winnie had a great big wooden tray dat she would fix all us little niggers' meals in an' call us up an' han' us a wooden spoon apiece an' make us all set down 'round the tray an' eat all us wanted three times ev'ry day. In one corner of the Kitchen set a loom ay jother use to weave on. She would weave way into the night lots of times.

The fust thing I "members is follerin' sy Mother er 'round. She wus the housegirl an' semastress an' ev'rywhere she went I wus at her heels. My father wus the overseer on the Hunt place. Is ever had no har d sork to do. My fust work wus 'tendin' the calves an' shinin' my Master's shoes. How I did love to put a Sunday shine on his boots an' shoest. He called me his nigger an' wus goin' ter make a barber out o' me if slavery had er helt on. As it wus, I shaved his long as he lived. He lived in the Quarters over on a high hill 'cross the springbranch from the white peoples' house. Is had confortable log cabins an' lived over there an' wus happy. Ole Uncle Alex Hunt wuz the bugler an' ev'ry mornin' at 4:00 o'clock he blowed the bugle for us ter git up, 'cept Sunday mornin's, us all slept later on Jundaws.

Slaves by Skill



For data files, see Fogel and Engerman, "Slave Sales and Appraisals, 1775-1865" ICPSR 7421

Slave Value by Skill



For data files, see Fogel and Engerman, "Slave Sales and Appraisals, 1775-1865" ICPSR 7421

Slave Value by Gender and Age



For data files, see Fogel and Engerman, "Slave Sales and Appraisals, 1775-1865" ICPSR 7421

- ▶ So we have a tremendous amount of detailed data on slavery
- ▶ This includes quantitative data on slaveholders, slave plantations, and slaves themselves
- ▶ It's the sort of data that economists routinely use in IO, agricultural economics, labor economics, etc.
- But should we apply simply take the methods of economics and apply them to these data?
- ▶ Let's start thinking about this with some polls and discussion

Igniting the Modern Debate over Slavery



See Tom Weiss's review on EH.net for a nice history of the controversy surrounding the book.

Fogel and Engerman's 'Principal Corrections'

Fogel and Engerman argued for ten 'corrections' to the traditional view of slavery:

- ▶ (1) Slave owners were not irrational, slaves were generally a highly profitable investment
- ► (2) There is no evidence that economic forces alone would have ended slavery
- ► (3) Slave owners anticipated future prosperity
- ▶ (4) Slave agriculture was more efficient than free agriculture
- ▶ (5) The typical slave field hand was more productive than his white counterpart

Fogel and Engerman's 'Principal Corrections'

- \blacktriangleright (6) Slavery was not incompatible with an industrial system
- ▶ (7) Slave breeding did not destroy the black family
- ▶ (8) The material conditions of slaves compared favorably with those of free industrial workers
- ▶ (9) Slave income was expropriated by owners but at a lower rate than previously assumed
- (10) The southern economy wasn't stagnating and was instead growing rapidly between 1840 and 1860

"[Time on the Cross is] simply shot through with egregious errors" – Paul David

"[Time on the Cross should be consigned] to the outermost ring of the scholar's hell, obscurity" – Thomas Haskell

"Time on the Cross is a failure" - Richard Sutch

The Reaction to Time on the Cross



"The mystique of empirical social research, in short, leads its acolytes to accept as significant only the questions to which the quantitative magic can provide answers. As a humanist, I am bound to reply that almost all important questions are important precisely because they are not susceptible to quantitative answers."

- Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., 1962

"The finest historians will not be those who succumb to the dehumanizing methods of social sciences, whatever their uses and values, which I hasten to acknowledge. Nor will the historian worship at the shrine of ... QUANTIFICATION."

- Carl Bridenbaugh, president of the American Historical Association, 1962








The Study of Slavery

- Fogel and Engerman are going to apply economic modeling and quantitative analysis to the study of slavery
- ▶ They lean on the plantation records, slave ship manifests and slave auction records we saw last class
- Much of this analysis relates to estimating worker productivity in ways that are already familiar to us from an earlier topic: indentured servitude
- Before getting to Fogel and Engerman's results, it is useful to go back to indentured servitude and show how simple economic modeling can help explain that institution's decline and the emergence slavery

Growth of the Colonial Population - Free laborers, indentured servants and slaves



- ▶ Two big changes altered the incentives to enter into indentured servitude: British wages rose and the cost of transatlantic passage dropped
- ▶ Higher British wages both reduced the incentive to migrate and made it easier to save up money for passage
- Lower cost of passage made it easier for laborers to finance the trip themselves
- Lower cost of passage also made it cheaper for employers in the colonies to acquire slaves













- So economics does seem to help us understand the transition from indentured servitude to forced labor, it also helps us understand the geography of slavery
- Slavery is typically thought of as a Southern phenomenon and the patterns of slaveholding seem to confirm this
- ▶ This doesn't mean that slavery wouldn't work in the Northern economy
- ▶ The Northern farms faced the same labor constraints as Southern farms and in fact slaves were occasionally used in wheat production
- The growth of Southern slavery had a lot to do with the productivity of slaves in growing the southern staple crops of cotton and tobacco (and sugar in Louisiana)
- ▶ It was this high productivity in cotton and tobacco that allowed southern farmers to compete for slave labor with Caribbean sugar plantations





Source: Gavin Wright, *The Political Economy of the Cotton South* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978): 16, adapted from USDA, *Atlas of Agriculture*, Part V, Advance Sheets (December 15, 1915).



The Productivity and Profitability of Slaves

- ▶ The patterns of slaveholding suggest that slaves were most productive in the South on cotton and tobacco plantations but this doesn't tell us whether slavery was more profitable than accomplishing the same tasks with free labor
- One of the big debates in economic history was whether or not slavery was profitable and efficient as an institution (very important to note here that economists' efficiency is independent of morality)
- This questions speaks to whether slavery was an economically viable institution (whether it would have continued if the Civil War didn't happen) and how important slavery was to American economic development, these questions matter outside of economics

The Traditional Economic View of Slavery

"[I]t was widely believed that the slave plantations were unprofitable and inefficient enterprises that were kept in operation by a class prepared to sacrifice its private economic interest, enduring economic stagnation for the South, in order to maintain its political and cultural hegemony."

-Fogel and Engerman, 1980

The Traditional Economic View of Slavery

Up until the 1970s, the traditional view of the economics of slavery could be summarized as follows:

- Slavery was an unprofitable investment
- Slavery was a dying institution
- ▶ Slave labor was economically inefficient
- ▶ Slavery retarded the growth of the southern economy
- Slavery provided extremely poor living conditions for the typical slave (in terms of consumption, health and physical abuse)

Coerced Labor and Efficiency

Why did people think slave labor was inefficient?

- ▶ The general belief was that coerced labor would put in less effort than paid labor and would be more likely to engage in forms of resistance
- People thought that even with the threat of punishment to get slaves to work, the productivity of a slave simply wouldn't be as high as that of a paid worker
- Under this view, using slave labor requires potentially costly supervision and lower levels of output per worker
- Slavery would be an inefficient institution that would have held back the southern economy

Back to Fogel and Engerman's 'Principal Corrections'

Fogel and Engerman argued for ten 'corrections' to the traditional view of slavery:

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What was so controversial?

- Several of Fogel and Engerman's points had already been conceded (the profitability of purchasing slaves, the role of slaves in industry and cities)
- ▶ The big controversy centered around the claims of efficiency and slave welfare
- ▶ The strongest objections were to the following assertions:
 - ▶ Slave plantations were more efficient than farms using free labor
 - ▶ The rate of expropriation was low and the material living conditions decent for slaves
 - Punishment was used less often than previously assumed
 - ▶ The family was the basic social unit under slavery

Farms=100), 1860				
Farm Size (number of slaves)	Old South	New South		
0	98.4	112.7		
1 to 15	103.3	127.2		
16 to 50	124.9	176.1		
51 or more	135.1	154.7		
All slave farms	118.9	153.1		
All farms	116.2	144.7		

Total Factor Productivity on Southern Farms Relative to Northern Farms (Northern Farms=100), 1860

Work hours per year for slaves and free farmers

Group	Hours per year	
Southern slaves	2,800	
Northern farmers	3,200	
Corn belt farmers	3,365	
Western dairy farmers	3,365	

Where was the efficiency gain coming from?

- ▶ Slaves weren't more productive because they were working longer hours
- ▶ They were actually producing more with a shorter work year
- ▶ One part of this increased productivity may have been scale economies
- Another reason might be that large plantations effectively used a different labor technology
- ▶ Larger plantations using slave labor could employ the gang system

- ▶ There are two general approaches to using slave labor on a farm: the task system and the gang system
- ▶ The task system:
 - Each slave is assigned an amount of work to get done by the end of the day (perhaps longer)
 - ▶ The work might require several different actual tasks
 - Amount of work was proportional to ability (hand rating)
 - Example: the day's work might be to plow, seed and hoe a certain area of land
- ▶ The task system could be implemented on any size of farm

Hand Ratings

4 The field-hands are all divided into four classes, according to their physical capacities. The children beginning as "quarter-hands," advancing to "half-hands," and then to "three-quarter hands;" and, finally, when mature, and ablebodied, healthy and strong, to "full hands." As they decline in strength, from age, sickness, or other cause, they retrograde in the scale, and proportionately less labor is required of them. Many, of naturally weak frame, never are put among the full hands. Finally, the aged are left out at the annual classification, and no more regular field-work is required of them, although they are generally provided with some light, sedentary occupation. I saw one old woman

Frederick Law Olmsted, "A Journey in the Seaboard Slave States" (1856)

Some typical tasks for slaves (based on a full hand):

- Ditcher: 1,000 cubic feet in light meadow, 200 cubic feet in cypress swamp
- Sewing rice: 2 acres per day
- ▶ Reaping rice: .75 acres per day
- ► Cooper: 18 barrels per week
- ▶ Wood chopper: cut and split 1 cord per day

The basic characteristics of the gang system used on plantations:

- ▶ Slaves were divided into groups (gangs) with specialization of tasks
- ▶ These groups might be based on skill and ability
- ▶ The division of labor within a gang made a member responsible for a precise task but also made performance dependent on the actions of the others in the gang
- ▶ The gangs were typically composed of 10 to 20 slavehands and headed by a single driver
- ▶ In many ways the gang system was achieving for plantations what the assembly line would accomplish for manufacturing

There are a few different explanations for why the gang system could lead to greater efficiency:

- Sorting slaves by physical capability led to greater productivity through exploiting comparative advantages
- Direct supervision in the gang system produced greater effort than incentive structure of the task system
- Steady and intense pace of work under the gang system (keep up to the people ahead you, don't get in the way of people behind you)

Gang System Efficiency: Comparative Advantage

An example of comparative advantage:

- Suppose that a strong worker can plow one acre per day or pick 50 pounds of cotton per day
- Suppose that a weak worker can plow one quarter of an acre per day or pick 25 pounds of cotton per day
- Notice that the strong worker has an *absolute advantage* in both tasks and a *comparative advantage* in plowing

Gang System Efficiency: Comparative Advantage

Total output with both workers' time divided evenly between tasks:

Plowed acres
$$=\frac{1}{2} \operatorname{day} \cdot 1 \operatorname{acre/day} + \frac{1}{2} \operatorname{day} \cdot \frac{1}{4} \operatorname{acre/day} = \frac{5}{8} \operatorname{acres}$$

Cotton picked $=\frac{1}{2} \operatorname{day} \cdot 50 \operatorname{lbs/day} + \frac{1}{2} \operatorname{day} \cdot 25 \operatorname{lbs/day} = 37.5 \operatorname{lbs}$

Gang System Efficiency: Comparative Advantage

Total output having weak worker specialized in picking and still aiming for $\frac{5}{8}$ acres plowed:

Plowed acres
$$=\frac{5}{8} \operatorname{day} \cdot 1 \operatorname{acre}/\operatorname{day} + 0 = \frac{5}{8} \operatorname{acres}$$

Cotton picked =
$$\frac{3}{8}$$
 day \cdot 50 lbs/day + 1 day \cdot 25 lbs/day = 43.75 lbs

Question: Could you profit from these comparative advantages the same way if you paid wages?

Gang System Efficiency: Steady and Intense Pace

own supervisor.¹ Upon many estates of small dimensions the owner would lead the plow-gang, making his own furrow, and requiring the negroes to keep pace with him, while his son would do likewise with the hoe-gang. Or if the planter spared himself from the manual labor, he would oversee the work either in person or through a hired overseer, or in many cases through a reliable slave whom he constituted foreman or "driver" and vested with authority subordinate to his own. In some localities, as in most of the Carolina rice district, the negroes instead of being worked strictly in gangs were given tasks of hoeing or plowing a specified area for each day.

Uldrich Phillips, "The Origin and Growth of the Southern Black Belts" (1905)

Gang System Efficiency: Steady and Intense Pace



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Total Factor Productivity on Southern Farms Relative to Northern Farms (Northern Farms=100), 1860

The Gang System and Efficiency

- ▶ The gang system allowed plantations to achieve much higher levels of output per worker than farms using free labor
- Potential efficiency gains came from specialization, assigning slaves to tasks based on ability, enforcing an intense rate of work, and creating interdependence and tension within and between gangs
- ▶ A slave in a gang system produced as much output in 35 minutes as a farmer (free or slave) using traditional methods did in an hour
- The net result of the gang system was that total factor productivity was 39 percent higher for gang system plantations than for free farms

The Gang System and Efficiency

Marginal product of slave labor by gender, in percent					
			Ratio of gang MPL to		
	Task system	Gang system	task MPL		
Male	.20	.25	1.25		
Female	.08	.15	1.875		
Results are from Toman (2005)					

Results are from Toman (2005).
Why not use the gang system everywhere?

- ▶ First, the gang system worked well for only a handful of crops: hemp, sugar, tobacco, cotton and rice
- Of these crops, the efficiency gains of the gang system were greatest for sugar, still substantial for cotton and rice, and relatively small for tobacco
- ▶ This limited the geographic area in which large slave plantations would have a big efficiency edge

Why not use the gang system everywhere?

- Another problem with the adoption of the gang system was that it was hard to implement with free labor
- ▶ The work was awful, when plantations tried to get free laborers to work in a gang system, they had to pay a premium of \$75 a year
- ▶ Problem is, the gains in efficiency only amounted to roughly \$23 a year

- ▶ So the efficiency gains were potentially large from using the gang system
- However, the work was so grueling that it wouldn't survive in the absence of slavery
- ▶ How did owners get the slaves to maintain such high levels of effort?
- ▶ Both punishment and rewards were used
- Punishment included whippings and loss of privileges
- ▶ Rewards included days off, material goods, better jobs

Stefano Fenoaltea's model of slavery and supervision:

- ▶ Distinguishes between effort-intensive and care-intensive production
- ▶ Punishment can get higher work effort at the expense of carefulness
- ▶ Rewards are better for achieving greater levels of carefulness
- Therefore, punishment gets used in effort-intensive work (plantation agriculture)
- Rewards get used in care-intensive work (real and human-capital intensive work)
- Explains patterns of slavery and patterns of punishment vs rewards across sectors



"[S]ince the predominant response to Emancipation was the breaking up of the gangs, rather than their reconstitution with free labor, the superior productivity of the gang slaves appears attributable specifically to their subjection to the lash, and not to conventional economies of scale."

-Stefano Fenoaltea

The Economic Viability of Slavery

1830-1860 (Evans, 1962)					
Period	Rate of Return				
1830-35	11.25				
1836-40	9.5				
1841-45	16.4				
1846-50	14.8				
1851-55	12.9				
1856-60	10.8				

Rates of Return on Southern Slaves,

The Economic Viability of Slavery

Average Accumulated Value (in dollars) of Income Expropriated from Slaves



The Economic Viability of Slavery

Capitalized Rent in an 18-year-old Slave



The Welfare of Slaves

- The data suggest that slavery was both profitable and would potentially continue to be profitable: slaveholders had economic incentives to perpetuate slavery
- ▶ Another big question, with as much debate surrounding it as the efficiency and profitability of slavery, is how slaves fared under the system
- From the owner's perspective, healthy slaves were important for productivity and happy slaves may also have improved productivity
- Concerns over productivity would guide decisions about the provision of food and material goods and the extent of physical abuse taking place

"I am very certain, from an attentive observation to this subject, that a negro deprived of a meat diet is not able to endure the labor that those can perform who are liberally supplied with it; and that the master who gives his field hands a half a pound of meat per day and two quarts of meal...is better compensated by slave labor than those who give the ordinary quantity."

-Virginia planter, 1837

Slave Diets

A Comparison of Diets (pounds per day)					
		Fogel and			
	Least-cost	Engerman	Sutch slave		
	diet	slave diet	diet		
Pork		0.31	0.53		
Beef		0.15	0.1		
Mutton		0.01			
Butter		0.01	0.01		
Milk	0.6	0.6	0.41		
Sweet potatoes	0.25	1.12	0.72		
Irish potatoes		0.08	0.06		
Cowpeas	0.58	0.35	0.12		
Corn	1.74	1.78	2.23		
Wheat		0.12	0.12		
Cost per day (cents)	4.4	8.2	8.7		

Slave Diets



Based on the information you provided, this is your daily recommended amount from each food group.

GRAINS 10 ounces	VEGETABLES 4 cups	FRUITS 2 1/2 cups	MILK 3 cups	MEAT & BEANS 7 ounces
Make half your grains whole	Vary your veggies Aim for these amounts each week:	Focus on fruits	Get your calcium-rich foods	Go lean with protein
Aim for at least 5 ounces of whole grains a day	Dark green veggies = 3 cups Orange veggies = 2 1/2 cups Dry beans & peas = 3 1/2 cups Starchy veggies = 9 cups Other veggies = 10 cups	Eat a variety of fruit Go easy on fruit juices	Go low-fat or fat-free when you choose milk, yogurt, or cheese	Choose low-fat or lean meats and poultry Vary your protein routline- choose more fish, beans, peas, nuts, and seeds

Slave Heights Relative to Other Groups



Slave Longevity Relative to Other Groups

Life Expectancy at Birth



The Health of Slave Children

- Along the dimensions of food consumption, adult height and longevity slaves didn't appear to be drastically behind other population groups
- Where the welfare of the slave population does look quite poor is among newborns and young children
- Newborns had very low birth weights, there were high rates of infant mortality and health problems persisted through early childhood
- ▶ Possible explanations:
 - ► Work patterns of mothers
 - Disease environment
 - ▶ Diets of slave children

Slave Mortality Rates

Age group	Slaves	Entire US population
0	350	179
1 to 4	201	93
5 to 9	54	28
10 to 14	37	19
15 to 19	35	28
20 to 24	40	39

Mortality Rates per Thousand in the Antebellum Period

The Health of Slave Children



The Health of Slave Children







Age



Age

- So it appears that slave children experienced very poor nutrition but then substantial catch-up growth in their late teens
- This is not simply a pattern of undernourished populations (developing countries with small children tend to have small teens and adults)
- Steckel argues it is a product of poor nutrition resulting from owners' investment decisions
- The return to additional productivity from better nutrition was considered less than the cost of that nutrition for children

Another Explanation: Selection

Age group	Slaves	Entire US population
0	350	179
1 to 4	201	93
5 to 9	54	28
10 to 14	37	19
15 to 19	35	28
20 to 24	40	39

Mortality Rates per Thousand in the Antebellum Period

Is there now consensus among economists?

SLAVERY

	Α	P	D	14. Slavery was a system irrationally kept in existence by
E	2	4	93	plantation owners who failed to perceive or were indifferent to
H	3	8	90	their best economic interests.
Pr	20/46			
%	100/100			
	Α	P	D	15. The slave system was economically moribund on the eve of
E	0	2	98	the Civil War.
H	3	3	95	
Pr	54/52			
%	98/92			
	Α	P	D	16. Slave agriculture was efficient compared with free
E	48	24	28	agriculture. Economies of scale, effective management, and
H	30	35	35	intensive utilization of labor and capital made southern slave
Pr	67/49			agriculture considerably more efficient than nonslave southern
%	100/95			farming.
	A	P	D	17. The material (rather than psychological) conditions of the
E	23	35	42	lives of slaves compared favorably with those of free industrial
H	22	19	58	workers in the decades before the Civil War.
Pr	75/85			
%	94/92			

From Whaples (1995) "Where is there consensus among American economic historians? The results of a survey on forty propositions"

Long Run Consequences of Slavery

- One reason for assessing the material conditions of slaves on the eve of the Civil War is to think about convergence in outcomes after the war
- Knowing the gap in economic and health outcomes at the time of emancipation is critical for knowing whether progress was made in closing that gap
- We'll consider a few different dimensions of how progress was or was not made after the Civil War

Long Run Consequences of Slavery



Slavery and the Economic Development of Africa

- ▶ Before focusing on the US, let's look at Africa
- Slavery as an institution had profound impacts on the development of Africa
- Consider Nathan Nunn's "The Long Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trade"
- Nunn looks at the effects of slave trading in Africa on modern economic outcomes of African countries
- ▶ He explores the argument of whether slave trades and colonialism are an explanation of African underdevelopment
- ▶ His basic story: slavery's impact on governmental institutions and social institutions helps explain the persistence of bad institutions and poor economic outcomes in parts of Africa today

Quick Review of the Slave Trade in Africa

- ▶ Slave trade lasted from roughly 1400 to 1900
- Colonial rule in Africa lasted between 1885 to 1960
- ► Four different slave trades:
 - ▶ Trans-Atlantic: slaves taken from West Africa, West-Central Africa and Eastern Africa to European colonies in the New World
 - ▶ Trans-Saharan: slaves taken from south of the Saharan desert to Northern Africa
 - Red Sea: slaves taken from inland Africa and shipped to Middle East and India
 - Indian Ocean: slaves taken from Eastern Africa and shipped to Middle East, India and plantation islands in the Indian Ocean

Quick Overview of the Slave Trade



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Quick Overview of the Slave Trade

- Over 18 million slaves were exported (12 million were through trans-Atlantic trade)
- Estimated that by 1850, Africa's population was half of what it would have been without the slave trade
- Slave trade led to social and ethnic fragmentation, political instability, weakening of states, corruption of judicial institutions

Countries Exporting the Most Slaves, 1400-1900

Isocode	Country name	Trans- Atlantic	Indian Ocean	Trans- Saharan	Red Sea	All slave trades
AGO	Angola	3,607,020	0	0	0	3,607,020
NGA	Nigeria	1,406,728	0	555,796	59,337	2,021,859
GHA	Ghana	1,614,793	0	0	0	1,614,793
ETH	Ethiopia	0	200	813,899	633,357	1,447,455
SDN	Sudan	615	174	408,261	454,913	863,962
MLI	Mali	331,748	0	509,950	0	841,697
ZAR	Democratic Republic of Congo	759,468	7,047	0	0	766,515
MOZ	Mozambique	382,378	243,484	0	0	625,862
TZA	Tanzania	10,834	523,992	0	0	534,826
TCD	Chad	823	0	409,368	118,673	528,862

ESTIMATED TOTAL SLAVE EXPORTS BETWEEN 1400 AND 1900 BY COUNTRY

Countries Exporting the Most Slaves, 1400-1900



Countries Exporting the Most Slaves, 1400-1900



Slaves Exports and Modern GDP per Capita



Economic Growth for Countries with the Lowest and Highest Slave Exports


The Long Term Effects of Slavery

- Clearly some areas of Africa were far more affected by slavery than others
- ▶ Today, those areas that exported the most slaves are less economically developed
- So why do we get persistent effects of slavery well after the slave trade ended?
- Nunn's answer is that the slave trade had profound impacts on several features of institutional development:
 - Ethnic fractionalization
 - State development
 - Levels of distrust

Slaves Exports and Modern Ethnic Fractionalization



Slaves Exports and 19th Century State Development



Slaves Exports and Modern Distrust



Beyond Africa



Beyond Africa



Beyond Africa



Percentage of votes for the NSDAP in the German National Election of 1928 (Voigtlander and Voth, 2012)





Fig. 1. Trust.

From Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) "Who Trusts Others?"

Table 1

Descriptive statistics^a

	Means [1]	Correlations with trust [2]
Trust	0.40	1
Confidence in banks & financial institutions	0.27	0.06*
Confidence in major companies	0.25	0.14*
Confidence in organized religion	0.30	0.04*
Confidence in education	0.32	0.01
Confidence in executive branch of federal government	0.17	0.06*
Confidence in organized labor	0.12	-0.03*
Confidence in press	0.19	0.01
Confidence in medicine	0.49	0.06*
Confidence in television	0.15	-0.04*
Confidence in supreme court	0.32	0.12*
Confidence in scientific community	0.40	0.15*
Confidence in congress	0.14	0.02
Confidence in military	0.35	-0.03*
Gini	0.41	-0.10*
Racial fragmentation	0.36	-0.10*
Ethnic fragmentation	0.67	-0.03*

^a Notes: *denotes significance at the 1 percent level.

From Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) "Who Trusts Others?"

<u>Classification of Cases in</u>	•		
Classification of Cases in			
Classification of Cases in			
Classification of Cases in			
Classification of Cases in			
	n Tuskegee	Study	
	Controls	Syphilitic	Total
Classification at initial examination	200	411	611
Cases added in 1938-1939	-	14	14
		the second second second second	and the second
Total - Original classification	200	425	625
Controls infected during observation	-9	+9	-
Controls reclassified as syphilitic			
on basis of additional history	-1	+1	-
on basis of treponemal tests	-8	+8	-
Total - Final classification	182	443	625
Reson Finde Stabouraderon	102	445	025
Known dead - Number	97	276	373
Percent	53.3	62.3	59.7
Remainder -	85	167	252
Examined in 1968			
Number	36	53	89
Percent	42.4	31.7	35.3





From Alsan and Wanamaker (2017) "Tuskegee and the Health of Black Men"



From Alsan and Wanamaker (2017) "Tuskegee and the Health of Black Men"

- Let's switch back from these big issues of trust to more narrow questions about economic outcomes after emancipation
- Emancipation certainly wasn't the end of differential treatment of black Americans in the US economy
- ▶ We're going to think about progress during Reconstruction and then during the Jim Crow era



a Anticle XIV.

Sution All persons vorn or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No State shall make a enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; ner shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Fourteenth Amendment, adopted 1868



Size of U.S. House of Representatives





- ▶ To think about the effects of black enfranchisement during Reconstruction, let's look at Logan (2018)
- Logan wants to think about how the election of black officials affected local government finance
- Before we get into the details, let's quickly look at a modern case cited by Logan
- We'll consider Beach and Jones (2017) "Gridlock: Ethnic Diversity in Government and the Provision of Public Goods"



FIGURE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF PER CAPITA PUBLIC GOOD SPENDING PATTERNS (RD sample)

Notes: Sample is restricted to the set of cities that ever experience a close election between a modal and non-modal candidate (i.e., an election that was decided by a margin of less than 7.1 percent). A modal candidate is a candidate whose ethnicity matches the city's modal ethnicity.



FIGURE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF NON-MODAL MARGIN OF VICTORY





Notes: Sample restricted to the set of cities that ever experience an election between a modal and non-modal candidate (i.e., an election that was decided by a margin of less than 7.1 percent). A modal candidate is a candidate whose ethnicity matches the city's modal ethnicity. Each "public goods" is simply total expenditures minus expenditures on "government administration" and debt repayment. The "public goods" category therefore includes all spending on roads, parks, police protection, sewerage, public transportation, etc.

TABLE 6—THE IMPACT OF A GROUP-SPECIFIC VICTORY ON LOG PUBLIC GOOD SPENDING PER CAPITA

	Asian (1)	Black (2)	Hispanic (3)	White (4)
Group wins	-0.034	0.081	0.036	-0.058
	(0.075)	(0.088)	(0.047)	(0.044)
Observations R^2	110	128	354	377
	0.974	0.958	0.915	0.935

Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered at the council level) are in parentheses. Column 1 is restricted to the set of cities that ever experience a close election between an Asian and non-Asian candidate. Column 2 is restricted to the set of cities that ever experience a close election between a black and nonblack candidate. Column 3 is restricted to the set of cities that ever experience a close election between a Hispanic and non-Hispanic candidate. Column 4 is restricted to the set of cities that ever experience a close election between a White and nonwhite candidate. Each regression includes city and year fixed effects. Close elections are defined as elections that were decided by a margin of less than 7.1 percent. All specifications include year and city fixed effects. The "group wins" indicator is also interacted with margin of victory.



Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of Black Officials During Reconstruction. Source: Foner (1996)

Table 1: Summary Statistics for Black Officials During Reconstruction

Variable	Ν	Mean	Std. Dev.
Entered Office	1331	1869.016	2.677765
Left Office	1331	1873.63	5.650746
Birth Year	1096	1832.479	11.56974
Death Year	366	1893.825	17.96578
Literate	1331	0.642957	0.479295
Victim of Violence	1331	0.104603	0.306147
Born a Slave	1331	0.288703	0.453318
Property Owner $(>\$100)$	1331	0.233612	0.423276
Executive	1331	0.334728	0.47206
Legislative	1331	0.567643	0.495576
Judicial	1331	0.094142	0.292128

Note: Data come from Foner (1996) for each unique black officeholder.

Table 3: OLS Estimates of 1870 County Taxes Per Capita

	Dependent	Variable : 1870	County Taxes	s per Capita
	I	п	III	IV
Black Officials Per County	0.0993***	.0993***	0.0986***	0.0925***
	(0.0106)	(0.0105)	(0.0132)	(0.0133)
Total Value of Farms 1870	6.11e-08***	8.93e-08***	8.51e-08***	7.24e-08***
	(1.88e-08)	(2.03e-08)	(2.01e-08)	(2.06e-08)
Segregation Measure	0.214	0.3028	0.271	0.348
	(0.318)	(0.352)	(0.349)	(0.348)
Percent Black	0.251	1.109 * * *	0.988^{***}	0.903***
	(0.214)	(0.252)	(0.252)	(0.253)
Total Population	-2.77e-06	0.0000279^{***}	-1.72e-05	-1.48e-05
	(2.98e-06)	(7.66e-06)	(1.28e-05)	(1.27e-05)
Manufacturing Wages		-1.27e-06***	-1.77e-06***	-1.80e-06***
		(2.45e-07)	(2.69e-07)	(2.68e-07)
Value of Manufacturing Output		3.37e-07***	3.68e-07***	$3.67e-07^{***}$
		(6.25e-08)	(6.23e-08)	(6.21e-08)
Number Illiterate		-0.0001638***	-9.40e-05***	-8.66e-05***
		(0.0000249)	(2.94e-05)	(2.94e-05)
Rail Access?		0.011499	0.0382	0.0404
		(0.085)	(0.0823)	(0.0820)
Water Access?		0.04222	0.0460	0.0408
		(0.08053)	(0.0800)	(0.0797)
Urban?		0.0231714	0.106	0.0680
		(0.17859)	(0.178)	(0.178)
County Wealth			4.95e-08***	4.89e-08***
			(1.13e-08)	(1.12e-08)
Republican Vote Share 1868 Preside	nt			0.00123***
				(0.000462)

- We have an endogeneity problem here, what type of counties decide to elect black politicians?
- ▶ It could be the type of county, and not the politician, driving results
- ▶ The Beach and Jones approach of close elections won't work here
- ▶ Instead, Logan is going to take and instrumental variables approach

- ▶ The basic idea is to find something correlated with electing a black politician but uncorrelated with the county traits we're worried about
- Logan is going to use the number of free black residents in a county prior to the Civil War
- ▶ Estimation takes place in two steps:
 - First, regress the number of black politicians on the 1860 free black population and use the results to predict the number of black politicians
 - Second, regress spending outcomes on the predicted number of black politicians

Table 5: IV Estimates for Black Elected Officials

	Ι	II	III	IV
OLS				
Black Officials Per County	0.0993^{***}	.0993***	0.0986^{***}	0.0925^{***}
	(0.0106)	(0.0105)	(0.0132)	(0.0133)
First Stage				
Free Blacks in 1860	0.00275^{***}	0.00159^{***}	0.00118^{***}	0.00115^{***}
	(0.000216)	(0.000236)	(0.000239)	(0.000236)
F-Statistic on Excluded Instrument	161.8	45.9	24.2	23.9
IV				
Black Officials Per County	0.197^{***}	0.24006***	0.207***	0.205**
	(0.0289)	(0.0574)	(0.0787)	(0.0802)
State Fixed Effects	Х	Х	Х	Х
Local Economic Conditions		Х	Х	х
County Wealth			х	х
Republican Vote Share (1868)				х

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 N= 825. All regressions include total value of farms in 1870, Logan-Parman segregation measure, percent black, and total population. Column II includes manufacturing wages, value of manufacturing output, number illiterate, rail access, water access, and urban county. Column III includes county wealth. Column IV includes Republican vote Share in the 1868 Presidential Election. All regressions include state fixed effects.

Table 7:	Effects of	Politicians	by	Branch	of	Government

Panel A: Judicial Officials			
Dependent Variable:	OLS - 1870 County	First Stage Officials	IV 1870 County
	Taxes Per Capita	Per County	Taxes Per Capita
Judicial Officials Per County	0.0659		3.494
	(0.0608)		(3.005)
Free Blacks 1860		6.77e-05	
		(5.39e-05)	
F-Statistic on Excluded Instrument		1.578	
Panel B: Executive Officials			
Dependent Variable:	OLS - 1870 County	First Stage Officials	IV 1870 County
	Taxes Per Capita	Per County	Taxes Per Capits
Executive Officials Per County	0.123^{***}		1.006
	(0.0233)		(0.638)
Free Blacks 1860		0.000235*	
		(0.000139)	
F-Statistic on Excluded Instrument		2.883	
Panel C: Legislative Officials			
Dependent Variable:	OLS - 1870 County	First Stage Officials	IV 1870 County
	Taxes Per Capita	Per County	Taxes Per Capita
Legislative Officials Per County	0.139***		0.283***
	(0.0232)		(0.109)
Free Blacks 1860		0.000837^{***}	
		(0.000135)	
F-Statistic on Excluded Instrument		38.204	

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.0.1. Note: N=825 in all regressions. Regressions include Republican vote share in 1868 Presidential Election, total value of farms, Logan-Parman Segregation, Total population, percent black, manufacturing wages, value of manufacturing output, number filterate, rail access, water access, urban contry, county wealth, state fixed effects.

Table 11: Exposure to Black Officials and Education

Panel A:	Plack Literacy Data					
	Black Literacy Rate					
Black Officials in County	-0.0221***	-0.0217***	-0.0193***	-0.0198***		
	(0.00388)	(0.00413)	(0.00365)	(0.00383)		
Exposed to Schooling	0.183^{***}	0.184^{***}	0.396***	0.388***		
	(0.0169)	(0.0170)	(0.00270)	(0.00274)		
Black Officials * Exposed to Schooling	0.0368^{***}	0.0361^{***}	0.0340^{***}	0.0334***		
	(0.00649)	(0.00640)	(0.00636)	(0.00629)		
Observations	48,376	48,376	48,376	48,376		
R-squared	0.099	0.116	0.177	0.194		
State Effects		х		х		
Birth Cohort Effects			Х	Х		
Percent Effect on Black Literacy Rate	6.85	6.72	6.33	6.22		

Race, Elections and the End of Reconstruction

provide the second s STATE OF LOUISIANA--PARISH OF JEFFERSON. Office of Sheriff and Tax Collector. 494 Received of a. S. White resident of Second (2) Ward, the sum of ONE DOLLAR, Poll ax for for the support of the PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

Race, Elections and the End of Reconstruction

Table 8: 1880 Taxes and Changes in Taxes 1870-1880

Panel A: 1880 Per capita Cou	nty Taxes		
Dependent Variable:	OLS 1880 County	First Stage Officials	IV 1880 County
	Taxes Per Capita	Per County	Taxes Per Capita
Black Officials Per County	0.0309***		-0.0902**
	(0.0068)		(0.0460)
Free Blacks 1860		0.0012^{***}	
		(0.0002)	
F-Statistic on Excluded Instru	iment	24.45	
Panel B: Change in Per Capit	a Taxes, 1870-1880		
Dependent Variable:	OLS 1870-1880 County	First Stage Officials	IV 1870-1880 County
	Taxes Per Capita	Per County	Taxes Per Capita
Black Officials Per County	-0.0129***		-0.0629***
	(0.0030)		(0.0199)
Free Blacks 1860		0.0012^{***}	
		(0.0002)	
F-Statistic on Excluded Instru	iment	24.45	

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: N=825 in all regressions. Regressions include Republican vote share in 1868 Presidential Election, total value of farms, Logan-Parman Segregation, Total population, percent black, manufacturing wages, value of manufacturing output, number illiterate, rail access, water access, urban county, county wealth, state fixed effects.

Black Outcomes After Reconstruction


Black Outcomes After Reconstruction



Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896

Black Outcomes After Reconstruction



Brown v. Board of Education, 1954

- During the Jim Crow era, the separate but equal doctrine led to large gaps in access to opportunity
- Particularly bad for black economic mobility were the racial gaps in school quality
- ▶ Let's take a quick look at a dissertation by Baker (2014)
- In particular, Baker has a really interesting way to get at the way public funds were allocated between black and white schools in the South during the Jim Crow era





(c) Percent of teachers with normal training

(d) Average school term length in days

Sources: Calculated using data collected from the Georgia Department of Education, Annual Report of the Department of Education to General Assembly of the State of Georgia, 1901-1931. The number of teachers with normal training is not available after 1922. The length of the school term was not reported separately by race prior to 1909.





Figure 2.1: Sources of County School Revenues by Year



Notes: Displays the county-level mean percentage of total school revenues per pupil from various sources. *Source:* Reports of the Georgia Department of Education, various years.

Figure 2.2: Percent Change in County-Level Appropriations around Census Years



Note: Each new school census caused varied changes in appropriations from the State School Fund at the county level in adjustment years. Each bar represents the percent change in state appropriations received by a county as a result of the relevant census update. *Source:* Reports of the Georgia Department of Education, various years.

1902 to 1904					
	$\Delta Total Exp PP$	$\Delta Teacher PP$	$\Delta Support PP$	$\Delta Super. PP$	$\Delta Capital PP$
$\Delta Approp PP$	0.638***	0.484***	0.042***	0.020***	0.084**
Constant	(0.10) 12.647*** (3.69)	(0.11) -10.897*** (4.12)	(0.01) 2.922*** (0.57)	(0.01) 1.468*** (0.28)	(0.04) 3.568** (1.42)
R-squared Counties Dependent Variable:	0.476 127	0.215 127	0.223 127	0.336 127	0.040 127
Mean Std. Dev.	16.891 56.739	-8.394 51.725	3.286 7.127	1.705 3.883	3.787 16.138
1912 to 1914					
	$\Delta Total Exp PP$	$\Delta Teacher PP$	$\Delta Support PP$	$\Delta \stackrel{(4)}{Super. PP}$	$\Delta Capital PP$
$\Delta Approp PP$	0.839***	0.357**	0.039**	0.041***	0.117
Constant	(0.32) 53.388** (23.20)	(0.15) 14.093 (10.55)	(0.02) -0.145 (1.18)	(0.01) 0.415 (0.88)	(0.20) 3.085 (15.16)
R-squared Counties	0.158 130	0.230 130	0.169 135	0.192 135	0.006 135
Dependent Variable: Mean Std. Dev.	-5.960 237.989	-21.446 113.208	-3.530 12.309	-2.136 9.285	8.027 144.047
1922 to 1924					
	$\Delta Total Exp PP$	$\Delta Teacher PP$	$\Delta Support PP$	$\Delta Super. PP$	$\Delta Capital PP$
$\Delta Approp PP$	0.972	0.867***	0.046**	0.027*	-0.186
Constant	(0.76) 175.474** (71.22)	(0.26) 20.290 (24.31)	(0.02) 3.053* (1.73)	(0.02) 3.069** (1.53)	(0.61) -69.002 (56.97)
R-squared Counties	0.016 146	0.200 146	0.210 146	0.175 146	0.014 146
Dependent Variable: Mean Std. Dev.	185.063 742.902	61.380 281.224	6.811 20.199	6.339 17.388	-102.412 593.713

Table 2.4: Estimates of the Effect of Budget Shocks on Various Expenditures

Notes: All regressions control for the contemporaneous change in enrollment. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All monetary figures are nominal.

1902 to 1904						
	$\stackrel{(1)}{\Delta Teac}$	her PP				
$\Delta Approp PP$	0.408*					
Black	(0.24) -19.154 (14.88)					
Black X $\Delta Approp PP$	-0.151 (0.29)					
Constant	6.615 (10.52)					
Local Tax Controls R-squared Counties	NO 0.096 206					
1912 to 1914	200					
1718 10 1717	$\stackrel{(1)}{\Delta Teacher} \stackrel{(2)}{PP}$		$\stackrel{(3)}{\Delta Capital} \stackrel{(4)}{PP}$		(5) ΔTotal Exp PP	
$\Delta Approp PP$	0.823*** (0.21)	0.800*** (0.20)	0.106	0.081	0.930***	0.881**
Black	-50.942** (24.29)	-45.364* (24.33)	-11.569 (40.30)	-5.100	-62.511 (40.57)	-50.46
Black X $\Delta Approp PP$	-0.681*** (0.23)	-0.643*** (0.23)	-0.096	-0.051 (0.38)	-0.777**	-0.694 (0.38)
Constant	41.512** (17.59)	35.380** (17.62)	15.724 (29.18)	9.802 (29.47)	57.237* (29.37)	45.182 (29.28
Local Tax Controls R-squared	NO 0.166	YES 0.186	NO 0.001	YES 0.009	NO 0.078	YES 0.109
Counties	254	254	254	254	254	254
1922 to 1924						
	$\stackrel{(1)}{\Delta Teacher} \stackrel{(2)}{PP}$		$\stackrel{(3)}{\Delta Capital} \stackrel{(4)}{PP}$		(5) $\Delta Total Exp PP$	
$\Delta A pprop PP$	1.370*** (0.29)	1.228*** (0.29)	-0.977 (0.81)	-1.102	0.392 (0.93)	0.126 (0.94)
Black	-36.319	-22.280 (37.85)	(0.81) 122.333 (103.33)	(0.82) 137.282 (106.30)	86.015	115.00
Black X $\Delta Approp PP$	(37.31) -0.810** (0.36)	-0.678* (0.37)	(105.55) 1.690* (1.01)	(106.50) 1.831* (1.04)	(117.96) 0.880 (1.15)	(120.89 1.152 (1.18)
Constant	(0.56) 37.281 (28.34)	(0.57) 20.985 (28.57)	-122.506 (78.48)	-136.757* (80.25)	-85.226 (89.59)	-115.77 (91.26
Local Tax Controls R-squared Counties	NO 0.178 292	YES 0.203 292	NO 0.032 292	YES 0.034 292	NO 0.038 292	YES 0.048 292

Table 2.7: Estimates of the Effect of Budget Shocks on Expenditures by Race

Notes: All regressions control for the change in race-specific enrollment and the change in total enrollment at the county level. Regressions represented by columns (2), (4), and (6) control for the change in local tax revenues per pupil and its interaction with the indicator variable for race. Standard errors are

- Baker's results regarding the funding of public schools by local governments are rather depressing
- Given this failure of local governments to provide adequate education for black students, there was a private response
- One major initiative was the Julius Rosenwald Fund, funding construction of 5000 schools for black students between 1912 and 1933
- Were these types of interventions successful in closing black-white schooling gaps?
- ▶ Let's take a look and Carruthers and Wanamaker (2013)





East Suffolk Elementary School





Table 4

Eq. (2) results: Impact of private Rosenwald contributions changes on local tax revenues and total spending in African-American and white public schools.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	African-American School spending	White School spending	Local Tax revenues
$\hat{\alpha}^k$ Current Rosenwald contributions	0.877***	1.335**	-1.1E-04
	(0.159)	(0.518)	(0.001)
	[0.565, 1.189]	[0.319, 2.351]	[-0.002, 0.002]
$\hat{\alpha}_{-1}^k$ Rosenwald contributions, one year lag	0.023	1.656	1.6E - 04
	(0.163)	(1.284)	(0.001)
	[-0.296, 0.343]	[-0.862, 4.174]	[-0.002, 0.002]
$\hat{\alpha}_{-2}^k$ Rosenwald contributions, two year lag	- 0.306*	0.940	-0.001
-	(0.176)	(0.980)	(0.001)
	[-0.561, 0.040]	[-0.981, 2.861]	[-0.003, 0.002]
$\hat{\alpha}_{-3^k}$ Rosenwald contributions, three year lag	-0.242	0.122	0.002
-3	(0.152)	(0.585)	(0.002)
	[-0.541, 0.056]	[-1.026, 1.269]	[-0.001, 0.006]
$\hat{\alpha}_{-4}^k$ Rosenwald contributions, four year lag	-0.188	-0.113	0.002*
-	(0.120)	(0.650)	(0.001)
	[-0.422, 0.046]	[-1.387, 1.162]	[-4.8E - 04, 0.005]
$\hat{\alpha}_{-5}^k$ Rosenwald contributions, five year lag	- 0.097	- 0.829	9.0E - 05
-5	(0.126)	(0.592)	(0.001)
	[-0.344, 0.149]	[-1.990, 0.332]	[-0.001, 0.001]
n (county-years, 1916–1940)	3444	3444	3529
Adjusted R ²	0.09	0.09	0.10

Notes: The estimating equation is

 $\Delta Y_{ct}^{k} = \alpha^{k} \Delta R_{ct} + \sum_{s=1}^{5} \alpha_{-s}^{k} \Delta R_{c,t-s} + \Delta \mathbf{X}_{ct} \beta^{k} + \theta_{c}^{k} + \theta_{t}^{k} + \varepsilon_{ct}^{k}$

where v_a represents total school expenditures, by race, and R_c measures total private expenditures on Rosenvald initiatives, θ_c^s is a county fixed effect and θ_1^s is a year fixed effect. Unreported control variables include changes in enrollment (by race and lagged one year), and changes in Census variables (interpolated between decennial years: total population, black population share, crop value per capita, and percent of land devoted to agriculture). Spending regressions also control for changes in revenues from local taxes (lagged one year). Regressions are weighted by total, county-wide Rosenwald contributions from 1921–1933 and estimated with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors reliable show each expenditure coefficient and 95% confidence intervals are in brackets.

*** indicates statistical significance at 99% confidence (with respect to zero), ** at 95%, and * at 90%.

Table 10

Eq. (7) results: school spending, school attendance, and literacy.

Outcome population	Attending or enrolled in school, 1910–1930			
	African-American	White		
Per-pupil real expenditures (current) n (census respondents) Adjusted R-squared	0.001* (0.001) 23,135 0.09	- 5.20E - 6 (-2.4E - 4) 29,102 0.11		
Outcome population	Can read and write, 1930			
	African-American	White		
Per-pupil real expenditures (average over age 7–13) n (census respondents) Adjusted R-squared	0.001* (5.5E-4) 6266 0.10	1.3E – 4* (7.5E – 5) 9347 0.06		

Notes: The estimating equation is

$$Y_{ict}^{k} = \alpha^{k} + S_{ct}^{k}\psi^{k} + \mathbf{X}_{i}^{k}\beta^{k} + \theta_{c}^{k} + \theta_{t}^{k} + \varepsilon_{ic}^{k}$$

where Y_{ict}^k is school attendance for age 7–17 respondents in the 1910–1930 U.S. Census, by race (top panel) or reading and writing literacy for age 15–23 respondents in 1930 (bottom panel). S_{ct} is per-pupil spending in a respondent's county of residence. X_i is a vector of individual characteristics, θ_c^k is a county fixed effect and θ_t^k is a year fixed effect. *** indicates statistical significance at 99% confidence (with respect to zero), ** at 95%, and * at 90%.

- Carruthers and Wanamaker find that Rosenwald funds did increase contemporaneous black schooling resources
- ▶ However, they find no long-term gains in spending in response to funds
- ▶ Why? Funds *crowded out* public expenditures and were diverted to white schools
- Better news is that Rosenwald beneficiaries realized human capital gains that outpaced those for white students
- ▶ This may be due to where white and black students were on their human capital production function

Announcements

- Remember that the second referee report due date is pushed back to December 1st
- Feel free to email me questions or drafts of referee reports or empirical projects
- Also feel free to stop by office hours (especially useful if you have data or graphing questions)
- ▶ We're starting our section on servitude and slavery today
- ▶ The required reading is Logan (2018) on Reconstruction
- ▶ The section after that will be on immigration and internal migration, readings will be Abramitzky, Boustan and Eriksson (2019) and Collins and Wanamaker (2014)

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- ▶ Thanksgiving break will lead to a bunch of small adjustments:
 - ▶ Thursday's office hours will be shortened to be from 11am to noon
 - Given that you'll be spread across time zones, we won't have a synchronous class period on Tuesday
 - ▶ Instead, I'll post a lecture's worth of videos on the economics of the 1918 influenza pandemic
 - I'll hold office hours from 9:30am to 11am on Tuesday over Zoom (only office hours for Thanksgiving week but I'll respond to emails all week)
- ▶ Final required readings: Logan (2018) on Reconstruction, Abramitzky, Boustan and Eriksson (2019) on the Age of Mass Migration and Collins and Wanamaker (2014) on the Great Migration

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